The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld
Jiirgen Habermas
The provisional concept of society proposed here is radically different in one respectfromthe Parsonianconcept:thematureParsons rein terpretedthestruc¬tural components of the lifcworld -culture, society, perso nality -as action systems constituting environments for one another. Without much ado, he subsumed the concept of the lifeworld gained from an action-theoretical perspective under systems -theoretical concepts. As we shall see below, the structuralcomponentsofthe lifeworldbecomesubsystems of ageneralsystem of action, to 'which the physical substratum of the lifeworld is reckoned along with the "behavior system." The p roposal That I am advancing here, by contrast, attempts to take into account the methodological differences between the internalist and the externalist viewpoints connected with the two conceptual strategies .
From the participant p erspective of members of a Iifeworld it looks as if sociologywith asystems-theoreticalorientationconsidersonly oneofthethree components of the lifeworld, namely, the institutional system, for which cultureand personality merelyconstitute complementaryenvironments. from the observer perspective of systems theory, on the other h and, it looks as if life¬world analysis confines itself to one societal subsystem specialized in maintaining structural patterns (pattern maintenance); in this view, the com ¬ponents of the lifeworld are merely internal differentiations of this subsystem which specifies the parameters of societal self-maintenance. It is already evident on methodological grounds that a systems theory of society cannot be self-sufficient. The structures of the iifeworld. with their own inner logic placing internal constraints on system maintenance, have to be gotten at by a hermeneutic approach that picks up on members' pretheoretical knowledge. Furthermore, the objective conditions under which the systems-theoretical objectification of the lifeworJd becomes necessary have themselves only arisen in the course ofsocial evolution. ndthiscallsforatypeofexplanation that docs not already move within the system perspective.
I understand social evolution as a second-order process of differentiation: system and lifcworld aredifferentiatedin the sensethatthe complexity ofthe one and the rationality of the other grow. But it is not only qua system and Lilla lifeworld that they are differ entiated; they get differentiated from one another atthe sametime.Ithasbecomeconventionalforsociologiststodistinguish the stages of social evolution as tribal societies, traditional societies, or societies organized around a state, and modern societies (where the econorn ic system has been differentiated out). From the system perspective, these stages are marked by the appearance of new systemic mechanisms and corresponding levels of complexity. On this plane of analysis, the uncoupling of system and lifew orld is depicted in such a way that the lifeworld, which is at first co¬extens ivewithascarcelydifferentiatedsocialsystem,getscut down moreand
tr~ moretoonesubsystemamong others.In tile process,systemmechanismsget
~' . ~:. ' further and further detached from the social structures through which social
integration takes place. As we shall see, mod ern societies attain a level of
[l,
system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are connectedwithoneanotherviadeJin guistifi edmediaofcornmunication: these systemicmechanisms-forexample,money-steerasocial intercoursethat has been largely disconnected from norms and values, above all in those sub¬systems of purposive rational economic and administrative action that, on Weber's dia gnosis, have become indep endent of their moral-political foun¬dations.
At the same time, the lifeworld remains the subsystem that defines the pattern ofthesocialsystemasawhole.Thus, systemicmechanismsneed tobe anchoredin the lifeworld:theyhavetobeinstitutionalized.Thisinstitutional¬i izationofnewlevelsofsystemdifferentiation canalsobe perceived from the I internal perspective of the life-world. Whereas system differentiation in tribal societies only leads to the increasing complexity of pregiven kinship systems, at higher levels of integration new social structures take shape, namely, the stateand media-steered subsystems.Insocietieswithalow degree of differentiation, systemic interconnections are tightly interwoven with mechanisms of social integration; in modern societies they are consolidated and objectifi ed into norm-free structures. Members behave toward formally organized action systems, steered via processes of exchange and power, as toward a block of quasi-natural reality; within these media-steered subsystems society congeals intoasecond nature.Actors have alwaysbeen able to sheeroff from an orien¬tation to mutual understanding, adopt a strategic attitude, and objectify normative contexts into something in the objective world, but in modern societies, economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge in which social relations are regulated only via money and power. Norrn-conforrnative attitudes and identity-forming social memberships are neither necessary nor possible in these spheres; theyare madeperipheralinstead.[. ..]
, In subsystems differentiated out via steering media, systemic mechanisms create their own, norm-free social structures jutting out from the lifeworld. These structures do, of course, re main linked with everyday communicative
practice via basic institutions of civil or public law. We cannot directly infer
from the mere fact that system and social integration have been largely un ¬coupled to linear depe ndency in one direction or the other. Both are
conceivable:the institutions thatanchorsteering mechanismssuchas power and money in the lifeworld could serve as channels either for the influence of the lifcworld on formally organized d omains of action or, conversely, for the
influence of the system on communicatively stru ctured contexts of action. In
the one case, they function as an institutional framework that subjects system maintenance to the nonnative restrictions of the lifeworld, in the other, as a
base that subordinates the life-world to the systemic constraints of material
reproduction and thereby "mediatizes" it.
Ln theoriesofthestateand ofsociety,bothmodelshavebeenplayedth rough. Modern natural law theories neglected the inner logic of a functionally
stabilized civil society in relati on to the state; the classics of political economy were concerned Io show that systemic imperatives were fundamentally in harmony with the basic norms of a polity guaranteeing freedom and justice. Marx destroyed this practically very important illusion; he showed that the
,
lawsofcapitalistcommodity production havethelatentfunctionofsustaini ng a structure that makes a mockery of bourgeois ideals. The lifeworld of the capitalist carrier strata, which was expounded in rational natural law and in the ideals of bourgeois th ought generally, was devalued by Marx to a socio¬cultural superstructure. In his picture of base and superstructure he is also raising the methodological dema nd that we excha nge the internal perspective of the lifeworld for an observer's perspective, so that we might grasp
the systemic imperatives of an independent economy as they act upon the
bourgeois lifeworld a iergo. Inhisview, onlyinasocialistsocietycouldthespell castupon the lifeworld by the systembebroken,could thedependenceofthe
superstructureon the base be lifted.
In one way, the most recent systems functionalism is an heir-successor to
Marxism, which it radicalizes and defuses at the same time. On the one hand, systems theory adopts the view that the systemic constraints of material production, which it understands as imperatives of self-maintenance of the generalsocialsystem,reachrightthr ough thesymbolicstructuresofthelife¬world. On the other hand, it removes the critical sting from the base-superstructure thesis by reinterpreting what was int ended to be an em¬pirical diagnosis as a prior analytical distinction. Marx took over from
bourgeoissocialtheorya presupposition thatwefoundagaininDur kheim:it isnota molterof indifference toasocietywhetherand towhatextentformsof
social integration dependent on consensus are repressed and replaced by anonymousformsofsystem integrativesociation.Atheoreticalapproachthat
presents the lifeworld merely as one of several anonymously steered sub¬systems undercuts this distinction. Systems theory treats accomplishments of
social and system integration as functionally equivalent and thus deprives
itselfof thestandard ofcommunicativerationality. Andwithout thatstandard, increases in complexity achieved at the expense of a rationalized lifeworld cannot be id entified as costs. Systems theory lacks the analytic means to pursue the question that Marx(also) built intohisbase-superstructure metaphor and Weber renewed inhisown wayby inquiringintotheparadoxofsocietalration ¬alization. Forus,this question takesontheformofwhetherthe rationalization
of the Iifeworld does not become paradoxical with the transition to mod ern societies. The rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible the emergence andgrowthofsubsystems whoseindependentimperatives turn backdestruc¬
tively upon the lifcworld itself. Ishall nov; take a closer look at the conceptual means by which this hypoth¬esis might be given a more exact formulation. The assu mption regarding a
"rnediatization" of the lifeworld refers to "interference" phenomena that arise when system and lifeworld have become differentiated from one another to such an extent that they can exert mutual influence upon one an other. The mediatizationofthelifeworldtakeseffecton andwiththe structuresofthelife¬
I
world; it is not one of those processes that arc available as themes within the
lifeworld, and thus it cannot be read off from the intuitive knowledge of members. Ontheother hand,itisalso inaccessiblefrom anexternal,systems¬
~
theoreticalperspective. Althoughitcomesabout countcrintuitivclvandcannot easily be perceived from the internal perspective of the lifeworld, there arc in¬dications of it in the formal conditions of communicative action.
The uncoupling of system integration and social integration means at first only a differentiation between two types of action coordination, one coming about through the consensus of those involved, the other through functional
;
interconnectionsofaction.System-integrativemechani smsattach totheeffects of action. As they work through action orientations in a subjectively in¬conspicuousfashion,theymayleavethe socially integrativecontexts ofaction which they are parasitically utilizing structurally unaltered -it is this sort of intenneshing of system with social integration that we postulated for the de ¬velopment level of tribal societies. Things are different when sys tem integration intervenesin the veryforms ofsocial integration.In thiscase,too, wehavetodowithlatentfunctional interconnections,but thesubjectiveincon¬spicuousness of systemic constraints that instrumenialize a communicatively structured lifeworld takes on the character of deception, of objectively false
I••• •
consciousness. The effects of the system on the lifeworld, which change the structure of contexts of action in socially integrated groups, have to remain hidden.Therep roductiveconstraintsthatinstrumentalizealifeworld without
~
r:
weakening the illusion of its self-sufficiency have to hide, so to speak, in the pores of communicative action. This gives rise to a structural violence that, withoutbecomingmanifest assuch, takesholdofthe formsofintersubjectivity ofpossible understanding. Structuralviolence isexercisedbywayofsystemic restrictionsoncommunication;distortionisanchoredin theformalconditions of communicative action in such a way that the interrelation of the objective, social, and subjective worlds gets prejudged for participants in a typical
t.
The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld 175
'.' ,:~
fashion. ln analogy to the cognitive a priori of Lukacs' "forms of objectivity," I shall introduce the concept of eform of understanding [Verstiindigungsform].
:~
Lukacs defined forms of objectivity as principles that, through the societal totality, preform the encounters of individuals with objective nature, norma¬tive reality, and their own subjective nature. He speaks of a priori forms of
objectivity because, operating within the framework of the philosophy of the
subject, he starts from the basic relation of a knowing and acting subject to thedomainof perceptibleandmanipulableobjects.After the changeof para¬
digm introduced by the theory of communication, the formal properties of the intersubjectivityofpossibleunderstandingcan taketheplaceoftheconditions of the objectivity of possible experience. A form of mutual understanding
represents a compromise between the general structures of communicative action and reproductive constraints unavailable as themes within a given life¬
t" "•
world. Historically variable forms of understanding are, as it were, the sectionalplanesthatresultwhensystemic constraintsofmateria1reproduction
t
inconspicuously intervene in the forms of social integration and thereby
t
,
med iatize the lifew orld. frshall now (a) illu strate the concept of a form of understanding with those
i,
F civilizations in which religious-metaphysical worldviews take on ideological functions, in order (b) to gain an analytic perspective on the hyp othetical sequence offormsof mutual understanding.
(a) In societies organized around a state, a need for legitimation arises that, forstr ucturalreasons, couldnotyetexistin tribalsocieties.Insocietiesorgan ¬ized throughkinship,theinst itutionalsystemisanchoredritually,thatis,ina practice that is interpreted by mythical narratives and that stabilizes its norma¬tivevalidity allbyitself. Bycontrast,theauthorityof thelawsin which ageneral political or der is articulated has to be guaranteed, in the first instance, by the ruler 's p ower of sanction. Bllt political d omination has socially integrating poweronly insofaras dispositionovermeansofsanction doesnotrest onnaked
"
repression, but on the authority of an office anc hored in turn in a legal order. For this reason, laws need to be intersubjectively recognized by citizens; they
have to be legitimated as right and proper. This leaves culture with the task of supplying reasons why an existing political order deserves to be recognized. Whereas mythicaln arrativesinterpretandmakecompre hensiblearitualprac¬
ticeofwhich theythemselvesarep art,religiousand metaphysical worldvi cws ofpropheticoriginhavethe form ofdoctrinesthatcan be worked upintellec¬tually and that explain and justify an existing political order in terms of the world-order they explicate.'
The need for legitimation that arises, for structural reasons, in civilizations is especially precarious. If one compares the ancient civilizations with even strongly hierarchized tribal societies, one finds an unmistakable increase in social inequality. In the framework of state organization, units with different structures can be functionally specified. Once the organization of social Jabor is uncoupled from kinship relations, resources can be more easily mobilized
and moreeffectivelycombined.Butthisexpansionofmaterialreproductionis
176 JOrgen Habermas
~
i.
gained at the price of transforming the stratified kinship system into a strati¬
f
fied class society. What presentsitsclf from a system perspective as nil integrationofsocietyatthelevelofanexpanded materialreproduction,means, from the perspective of social integration, an increase in social inequality,
wholesale economic exploitation, and the juridically cloaked repression of I dependent classes.Thehistoryofpenal law provides unmistakableindicators of the high degree of repression req uired in all ancient civilizations. Social movements that can be analyzed as class struggles -although they were not tcarriedonassuch-poseathreattosocialintegration.Forthisreason,thefunc¬tionsofexploitationandrepressionfulfilledbyrulersand rulingclassesinthe systemic nexus of m aterial reproduction have to be kept latent as far as
t-
f¬
possible. Vvorldviewshavetobecomeideologica J1y efficacious. r•..J I
f
t
Atfirst glance,itstrikes oneas puzzling thatideological interpretationsof the
II.
world and society could be sus tained against allappearances of barb aricinjustice.
f•
The constraints of material reproduction could not have reached so effectively and relentlessly throughtheclass-specificlifeworldsofcivilizations if cultural traditions had not been immunized against disson ant experiences. J would explain this unassailability by the systemic restrictions placed on communi¬cation. Altho ugh religious-metaphysical worldviews exerted a strong attraction on intellectual strata; although they provoked the hermeneutic efforts of many generations of teachers, theologians, educated persons, preachers, m andarins, bureaucrats, citizens, and the like; although they were reshaped byargumentation,givenadogmaticform,systematizedand ration¬
I
alized in terms of their own motifs, the basic religious and metaphysical
I•
I
conceptslayatalevelof undifferentiated validityclaimswhere therationality potentialofspeechremains moretightly boundthanin theprofanepracticeof everydaylife,whichhadnot beenworked throughintellectually.Owingtothe fusionof antic,normative, and expressiveaspectsofvalidity,and to the culti¬callyrooted fixationofacorrespondingbeliefattitude,thebasic conceptsthat carried, as it were, the legi timation load of ideologicalJy effective worldviews were imm unized against objections already within the cognitive reach of everyday communication. The im munization could succeed when an institu¬tional se paration be tween the sacred and the profane realms of action ensured thattraditionalfoundations werenottakenup "in thewrong place";within the domainoftilesacred, communication remained systenzatically restricted due to the lack of differentiation between spheres of va lidity, that is, as a result of the [orma! conditions ~fpQssi1J le understanding?
The mode of legitimation in civilizations is thus based on a form of under ¬standing that systemically limits possibilities of com munication owing to its failure to differentiate sufficiently among the various validity claims. Earlier
i.
I
weplaced mythical,religious-metaphysical,andmodern worldviewsinahier¬archy, according to the degree of deccntration of the world-understandings they make possible. Analogously, we can order action orientations, and the realms of action they define, accord ing to the degree of differentiation of
I.
The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld
validityaspects,andin this waywe can getattherelative apriorioftheform ofunderstanding d ominantat agiven time and place.These forms of the inter¬511bjecti'uity of mutual understanding do not reflect the structures of dominant worldviews in any symmetrical m anner, for established interpretive systems do notpervade allareasofactionwith the sameintensity.Aswe haveseen,in civilizations the immunizing power ofthe form of understandingderives from a peculiar, structurally describable differential between two realms of action: in comparison to profane action orientations, sacred ones enjoy a greater authority,even th oughvalidityspheresarelessdifferentiated andthepoten¬tialforrationalityislessdeveloped insacred thanin profanedomains ofaction.
(b) With asystematic investigation offormsof understan ding in mind,Tshall distinguish four domains of action: (1) the domain of cuItic practice; (2) the domaininwhichreligioussystems ofinterpretation have the powerdirectlyto orienteveryday practice;andfinallytheprofanedomainsinwhichthecultural shock of knowledge is utilized for (3) communication and (4) purposive activity, without thestructures ofthe worldview directlytakingeffect in action orienta tions.
Since I regard (1) and (2) as belonging to the sacred realm of action, I can avoid difficulties that result from Durkheims oversimplified division.
Magical practicescarried onbyindividuals outsideoftheculticcommunity should not be demoted, as Durkheim proposed they sho uld, to the profane realm.Everyday practiceisp ermeated througboutwith ceremonies thatcannot be understood in utilitarian terms. It is better not to limit the sacred realm of action toculticpractice,buttoextend itto theclassofactions based on religious patterns ofinterpretation.'
Furthermore, there are internaI relations between the structures of world¬views and the kinds ofculticactions:to myth therecorresponds a ritual practice (and sacrificial actions) of tribal members; to religious-metaphysical world¬views a sacramental practice (and p rayers) of the congregation; to the religion of culture [B ildullssrcligicm] oftheearly modernperiod,finally,a contemplative presentationofauraticworks ofart.Along thispath,cultic practicegets"dis¬enchanted," in Weber's sense; it loses the character of compelling the gods to some end, and it is less and less carried on in the consciousness that a divine power can be forced to do something."
Within the realm of profane action r shall di stinguish between communi¬cative and purposive activity; J shall assume that these two aspects can be distinguished even when corresponding types ofaction (not to mention domains
ofaction defined by thesetypes)havenot yetbeen differentiated.Thedistinc¬tion between communicative and purposive activity is not relevant to the sacred realm. In my view, there is no point in contrasting religious cults and magical practices from this perspective."
The next step would be to place the practices in different domains of action in a developmental-logical order according to the degree to which aspects of validity have been differentiated from one another. At one end of the scale stands ritual practice, at the other end the practice of argumentation. If we
178 JOrgen Habermas
further consider that be tween the sacred and the profane domains there are
differentials in authority and rationality -and in the opposite directions ¬
we then have the p oints of view relevant to ordering the forms of under¬
standing in a systematic sequence. The following schema (figure 12.1)
represents four forms of mutual understanding ordered along the line of a
progressive unfettering of the rationality potentia]in herentin communicative
action. The areas (1-2) and (3-4) stand for the form of understanding in archaic
societies,theareas(5-6)and(7-8) for thatincivilizations,the areas(9-10)and (11-12) for that in early modern societies.
Takingthearchaicformof understandingasan exa mple,Ishallnext givea somewhatmoredetailedaccountofthe contrastingdirectionsofthedifferen¬tials in authority and rationality between the sacred and the profane domains
r:;
of action. Following that 1 shall comment more briefly on the forms of under¬
L
standing typicalofcivilizations (5-8) andofearly modern societies(9-12).
(ad 1 and2)Wefind ritualizedbehavioralreadyinvertebratesocieties;in the transitional field between primate hordes and paleolithic societies, social in¬tegration was probably routed primarily th rough those strongly ritualized modes of behavior we counted above as symbolically mediated interaction. Only with the transformation of primitive systems of calls into grammaticalJy regulated,propositionally differentiated speech wasthesocioculturalstarting point reached at which ritualized behavior changed into ritualized action; language opened up, so to speak, an interior view of rites. From this point on, we no longer have to be content with describing ritualized behavior in terms of
!
r .:
its observable features and hyp othesized functions; 1\Te can try to understand
(:
rituals-insofarasthev havemaintain edaresidualexistenceandhavebecome
-'
known to us thr ough field studies.
A modern obse rver is struck by the extremely irrational character of ritual practices. The aspects of action that we cannot help but keep apart today are merged inone andthesameact.Theelementofpu rposiveactivitycomesou.t in the fact that ritual practices are supposed magically to bring about states in the world; the element of normatively regulated action is noticeable in the
~~ ,
qualityofobligationthatemanatesfromthe rituallyconjured,atonceattracting
'";:
and terrifying, powers; the element of expressive action is especially clear in the standardized expressions of feeling in ritual ceremonies; finally an asser¬toric aspect is also present inasmuch as ritual practice serves to represent and reproduce exemplary events or mythically narrated original scenes.
Ritual practice is, of course, already part of a sociocultural form of life in 'which ahigherformofcomm unicationhasemerged with grammaticalspeech. Language (in the strict sense) breaks up the unity of teleological, normative, expressive,andcognitiveaspectsofaction.Yetm ythical thou ghtshields ritual practice from the tendencies toward decomposition that appear at the level of language (with the differentiation between action oriented to mutual understanding and to success, and the transformation of adaptive behavior intopurposiveactivity).Mythholdsthesa measpectstogether on theplane of
interpretation that are fused together in ritual on the plane of practice. An in ¬terpretation of the world that confuses internal relations of meaning with external relations among things, validity with empirical efficacy, can protect ritual practice against rips in the fabric woven from communicative and pur¬posive activity indistingui.shably. This expl ains its coexistence with profane contexts of cooperation in w hich goal-oriented actions arc effectively co¬ordinated within the framework of kinship roles. The experience gained in everyday practice is worked up in myth and connected with narrative ex¬planationsoftheordersofthe worldandofsociety.in thisregard,mythbridges over the two domains of action.
We can see in the formal structures of the relevant action orientations that there is a rationality differential between sacred and profane domains. At the heart of the sacred realm is ritual practice, which stands or falls with the inter¬weaving of purposive activity and communication, of orientations to success with orientations to mutual understanding. It is stabilized by a my thicaI und er¬standing of the world that, while it develops in narrative form, that is, at the levelof grammaticalspeech, nonethelessexhibi tssimilar categoricalstructures. In the basic categories of m yth, relations on validity are still confused with relationsofeffectiveness.On theotherhand,themythicalworldviewisopened to the flow of experience from the realm of profane action. Everyday practice already rests on a difference betw een aspects of validity and reality.
(ad 3 and 4) ft is above all in the areas of production and warfare that co¬operation based on a division of labor develops and requires action oriented to success.From thestandpointofdevelopmentalhistoryaswell,efficacyisthe earliest aspect of the rationality of action. As long as truth claims could barely be isolated on the level of communicative action, the "know-how" invested in technical and strategic rulescould notyettaketheformofexplicitknowledge. In contrast to magic, the profane practice of everyday life already calls for differentiatingbetweenorientationstosuccessand to mutualunderstanding. However,within communicative action theclaims to truth,to truthfulness,and to rightness likely flow ed together in a whole that was first broken up in a methodicalfashion when, with theadv entofwriting,astratumofliteratiarose who learned to produce and process texts.
The normative scope of communicative action was relatively narrowly restricted by particularistic kins hip relations. Un der the aspect of fulfilling standardized tasks, goal-directed coopera tive actions rem ained embedded in a communicative practice that itself served to fulfill narrowly circumscribed social expectations.Theseexpectationsissued from asocialstructureregarded as part of a mythically explained and ritually secured world-o rder.The mythi ¬cal system of interpretation closed the circuit between profane and sacred domain s.
(ad 5 and 6) When a holistic concept of validity was constituted, internal relations of meani ng could be differentiated from external relations among
The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld
things, though it was still not possible to discriminate among the various aspects of validity. As Weber has shown, it is at this stage that religious and met aphysical worldviews arise. Their basic concepts proved to be resistant to l:'veryattemptto separateofftheaspectsofthe truc,thegood,and theperfect. Corresponding to such worldviews is a sacramental practice with forms of prayer or exercises and with demagicalized communication between the in¬dividual believer and the divine being. These worldviews are more or less dich otomousinstructure; theyset upa"worldbeyond"andleaveadem ythol¬ogized "this world " or a desocialized "world of appear ances" to a disenchanted everyday practice.Intherealm of profane action, structures take shape thatbreakup theholisticconceptofvalidity.
(ad 7 and 8) On the level of communicative action, the syn drome of validity claims breaks up. Particip ants no longer only differentiate between orien ¬tations tosuccessand tomutual understanding, butbetweenthedifferentbasic pragmaticattitudes aswell.A politywithastate andconventionallegalinsti¬tutions has to rely on obedience to the law, that is, on a norm-conforming attitude towardlegitimateorder.Thecitizensofthestate mustbeabletodis¬tinguish this attitude -in everyday actions as well -from an objectivating attitude toward externalnatureandanexpressive attitude vis-a-vis their own inner nature. At this stage, communicative action can free itself from particu¬laristiccontexts,butitstays inthespacemarked outbysolid traditionalnorms. An argu mentative treatm ent of texts also makes participants aware of the differencesbetween communicativeaction and discourse.Butspecificvalidity claims aredifferentiatedonlyontheplaneofaction.Thereare notyetformsof argumentation tailored to specific aspects of validity."
Purposiveactivityalso attainsahigherlevelof rationality.When truthclaims can be isolated, it becomes possible to see the int ernal connection between the efficiencyofactionoriented tosuccessandthe truthofempiricalstatements, and to make sure of technical know-how. Thus practical professional knowl¬edge can assume objective shape and be tran smitted through teaching. Purposive activity gets detached from unspecific age and sex roles. To the extentthatsociallabor is organized vialegitimate power,specialactivitiescan define occupational roles.
(ad 9 and 10) That validity claims are not yet fully differentiated at this stage can be seen in the ell lturaltradition oftheearlymodern period. Independent cultural value spheres do take shape, but to begin with only science is insti¬tutionalized inanunambigu ousfashion,thatis, undertheaspectofexactlyone validityclaim.Anautonomousartretainsitsauraand theenjoymentofartits contemplative character;both featuresderive from itsculticorigins. Anethics of conviction remains tied to the context of relig ious traditions, however subjectivized: postconventional legal representations are still coupled with truthclaimsin rationalnaturallaw andform thenucleusof what RobertBellah has called "civil religion. " Thus, although art, morality and law are already
182 Jurqen Habermas
differentiated value spheres, they do not get wholly disengaged from the sacred domain so long as the int ernal development of each does not proceed unambiguously under preciselyonespecificaspectofvalidity.On the other hand, the forms of modern religiosity give up basic d ogmatic claims. They destroy the metaphysical-religious "world beyond" and no longer dichotomouslycontrastthis profaneworld to Transcendence,or the worldof appearances to the reality of an underlying Esscncc. In domains of profane action,structurescan takeshape thatare defined byan unrestricteddifferenti¬ationofvalidityclaimson thelevelsofaction and a rgumen ta tion.
(ad 11and 12)It ishere thatdi scoursebecomes relevantfor profanespheresof action,too.In everyday communication,participants can keepap artnot only differ entbasicp ragmaticattitudes,butalso thelevelsofactionanddiscourse. Domains of action normcd by positive law with post-traditional legal insti¬tutions, presuppose that participants are in a position to shift from naively performing actions to reflectively engaging in argumentation. To the extent that the hypothetical discussion of normative validity claims is institutional¬ized, the critical potential of speech can be brou ght to bear on existing institutions.Legitimateordersstillappear tocommunicativelyacting subjects as somethingnormative, but thisnormativity hasa different quality insofar as institutions are no longer legitimated per se through religious and meta¬physical w orJdv iews.
Purposive activity is freed from normative contexts in a more radicalized sense. Up to this point, action oriented to success remained linked with norms of action and em bedded in communicative action within the framework of a task-oriented system of social cooperation. But with the legal institutional¬ization of the monetary medium, success-oriented action steered by egocentric calculations of utility loses its connection to action oriented by mutual under¬standing. This strategic action, which is disengaged from the mechanism of reaching understanding and calls for an objectivating attitude even in regard tointerpersonalrelations,is promoted tothemodelformethodicallydealing withascientificallyobjectivatednature.In theinstr umentalsphere,pur posive activitygetsfree ofnormativerestrictionstotheextentthatitbecomeslinked toflowsofinformationfrom thescientific system.
Thetwoareasontheleftinthebottomrow offigure12.1havebeen leftempty because, with the development of mod ern societies, the sacred domain has largelydisintegrated, oratleasthaslostitsstructure-formingsignificance.At thelevelofcompletelydifferentiatedvalidityspheres.artsheds itsculticback¬ground, just as morality and law detach themselves from their religions and metaphysical background. With this secularization of bourgeois culture, the cultural value sp heres separate off sharply from one another and de velop according to the standards of the inner logics specific to the different validity claims.Culturelosesjustthoseformalpropertiesthatenabled it totakeonideo¬logical functions. Insofar as these tendencies -schematically indicated here -actually doestablishthemselvesindevelopedmodernsocieties,thestructural
forceofsystem imperativesinterveningintheformsofsocialintegrationcan no longer hide behind the rationality differential betw-een sacred and profane domains. The modern form of understanding is too transparent to provide a niche for this structural violence by means of inconspicuous restrictions on communication. Under these conditions it is to be expected that the com¬petition between forms of system and social integration would become more
.~
visible than previously. 1n the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration even in those areas where a consensus-dependent co¬ordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproductionofthelifeworld isatstake.In theseareas,the mediaiization of the lifeworld assumes the form of a colonization.
Notes
N. Eisenstadt, "Cultural Traditions and Political Dynamics: The Origins and Modes of Ideologica IPolitics." British Journal of Sociology 32, 1981, p. 155ff.
2 M.Blochalsouses acommunications-theoretical approachtoexplaintheideologi¬calfunctionsthatactionspassed downfrom the periodoftribalsocietycan takeon in class societies. The formalism according to which ritual practices can assume such functionsmaybecharacterizedin termsofrestrictions on communication. M. Bloch, "The Disconnection of Power and Rank as a Process." In S. Friedman and
M.J. Rowland (eds), The Evolution of Social Systems (Lon don,1977); and idem,"T he Past and Present in the Present." Man , 13, 1978, p. 278ff. 3 Sec, for exa mple, L.Mair, A ll Introduction toSocialAnthropology (rev.edn), (Oxford, 1(72), p. 229. 4 On the contrast between ritual and sacramental practice, sec Mary Douglas,
Natural SYl11ho!s (London, 1973), p. 28I. 5 L. Mair, An Introduction to Socia! Anthropology, p. 229. 6 Strictlyspeaking.noteventhephilosophicaldiscourseofGreekphilosophywas
specialized about the isolated validity claim of p ropositional truth.