Pierre Bourdieu on forms of capital
Maitre penseur, recently died
Our last major conflict theorist
Rejects Marxist approaches, hopes to be rid of them once and for all
Did early research on Kabyle tribe in
Used quantitative techniques, highly professional as a sociologist.
Politically active: spoke out often against ‘neo-liberalism’
Ideas of:
“Social space” and “power field”
Forms of Capital and their Transformation
Habitus: bio-cognitive imprint of the social environment
Economic capital
Social capital
Cultural Capital
Transformation (conversion) of these
Position in social field/space is relative
Predicts tastes, likes and dislikes: e.g. size and position of TV in house
Habitus: why working-class men don’t like keyboard work, stockbrokers
Pierre Bourdieu, Snobs, and Omnivores
Distinction (excerpt)
Pierre Bourdieu is perhaps the most influential sociologist alive today. Like Foucault before him, in
For the purposes of this course, we’ll cover some of his work on Structure, Habitus, and Social Space, and then we’ll move on to Michele Lamont’s revision and extension of his ideas.
Social Space and Social Classes.
Bourdieu's Opponents:
(1) A break with Marxists: (I.e. 'objective' reality). Bourdieu is interested in RELATIONSHIPS, on more levels than just the economic, and argues that how people
interpret and make sense of their relations matters (this is the subjective element).
He also has s definite focus on POWER STRUGGLES.
Social Space: A geographic/mathematical metaphor for how people are arranged in society. Bourdieu defines social space as:
"a (multi-dimensional) space constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active in the social
universe under consideration, that is, able to confer force or power on their possessor in that universe." (p.229).
The points to keep in mind with this def:
(1) Social space has multiple dimensions (ex economic, educational, cultural, etc.: n dimensions) These dimensions can usually be categorized as a form of
Capital.
(2) "...constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution..." This mean that how
much and what kind of the particular capital one has is the basis for sorting along the dimensions.
(3) "...by the set of properties active in the social universe under consideration, that is, able to confer
force or power on their possessor in that universe." The quantity or quality (i.e. point 2) of a given good only matters to the extent that the good in question
is 'active' in the social world of interest. This part of the definition implies an element of contextual specificity. Two groups' relative position depend on the
particular 'field' that is active. If we're dealing in the economic field, then the relative position of $$ matters, if we're dealing with the educational, then
that's what matters. [note, that this discussion is about one dimension at a time, Bourdieu does not think that way - this is for illustration only, the point is that in
some struggles, the relative value of a given dimension will change.].
Power follows from the ability to mobilize capital.
The social space is a field of forces -- the system of relations, alliances, and power struggles. His vision of social space is NOT one that is (necessarily)
static, but instead constantly infused with power struggles. Thus we see the world as a system of 'objective power relations.'
Is this paranoid? Overdramatic??
This allows us to see the social world in two ways, as the positions themselves thusly: (take culture and econ as examples)
Hi Culture
|
| A
|
|
Poor ---------------------------- Rich
|
| B
c |
|
Low Culture
In this picture, the three groups are arrayed on these two dimensions (thus C is poor and holds mainly 'low culture' values, A is rich with 'high culture' , etc).
Because these positions are at the same time relations, because domination follows from the ability to utilize this capital, we could instead view this picture
as:
A -> B-----> C
\ _____/
Where A dominates (a little) B, and both B and A dominate C. What Bourdieu wants to claim is that these systems of relations are in constant contest -- not ONLY
in who gets to be WHERE, but what having a certain quantity/distribution of a good GIVES you, ie what it MEANS.
The dimensions are the elements that give power (education, money, social contacts, etc) in general, these elements form types of CAPITAL. The four
general types of capital for Bourdieu are:
1.Economic Capital: How much money one has.
2.Cultural Capital: The systems of value and meaning a person can draw on, what counts as 'good' for a group. (the main distinction is between
high and low culture for Bourdieu, thus the difference between a person who listens to Garth brooks and goes to the bowling alley every weekend versus a
person who reads Shakespeare, drinks fine wine, and goes to the museum all the time).
3.Social Capital: The set of relations one can draw on: who you know that MATTERS.
4.Symbolic Capital. : the extent to which one has the power to institute, to NAME, to define who is who. Symbolic power rests on RECOGNITION, i.e., give or take, legitimacy (Weber).
Bourdieu argues that each of these types of capital is transformable (to some extent), i.e. able to be converted and reconverted, one to the other. Thus if you have enough money you might get to know a new
set of important people, etc.
The two dimensions along which each type of capital are arrayed is Volume and composition. Thus the AMOUNT of money one has, and the TYPE of
money matter (i.e. cash vs stocks vs gold vs land).
Classes on Paper:
On the basis of the distribution of the various forms of capital, we can find groups of people who have 'similar' distributions. These are 'classes' in the
logical sense -- people who occupy the same cell in a cross-tabulation. BUT, we can't necessarily assume that these classes are self-recognized. This is the
long standing differentiation between classes in-themselves vs. classes for themselves.
What exists is a space of relations, out of which may or may not emerge a class per se.
We can compare this to Marx’s theories of class, in which he assumes that groups form from similarity, but it does not explain how the groups form. Instead, through a theoretical ‘slight of hand’, the
essential questions are spirited away:
We don’t ask about the political work needed to organize and created a self-recognized, mobilized class
Don’t explain how the formal ‘classes’ of social scientists are related to the actual, living classes in society.
Classes and class fragments develop “habituses”—roughly but not quite subcultures
The Perception of the social world and political struggle.
One must account for how actors see the world to make sense of how they act. That is, we ned to look to the social construction of identity.
One's perspective in the world is due to two things:
1) 'Objective': People see the world differently because they occupy a different space in the world.
2) 'subjective': The tools brought to bear, the language used, are all the products of previous struggles, and influence the meaning of the very dimensions
that people array themselves along.
Thus, not only are people seeing the world from different spaces, but the very view of that space, the relevant value of any given quantity/quality
distribution is different depending on a group's past history of struggle.
While Bourdieu argues that people TEND to accept the position they find themselves in, there is social change, and it comes from struggles for power related
to (1) and (2).
in an earlier essay, Bourdieu writes
“Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories which make it possible, are the stake par excellence of the political struggle, a struggle
which is inseparably theoretical and practical, over the power of preserving or transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of
perception of that world.”
These are social categories: racial, social class, economic categories, that change over time
So being able to define the dimensions of status, to identify the subject of political debate and shape the way issues are seen to be related are all symbolic actions,
and they are the means through which politics are carried out. Thus, being able to control these means gives one control of political outcomes. The power of
naming is crucial.
Examples:
? Political rhetoric about abortion: proponents use ‘right-to-choose’ language, opponents use ‘rights-to-life’ language.
? Use of the word ‘Liberal’ in presidential campaigns
Symbolic Capital: Any capital when it is perceived by an agent as self-recognized power to name, to make distinctions.
It follows that objective power relations reproduce themselves in symbolic power.
The power to create titles
Citizenship is bestowed by the government,
The definition of ‘adult’ or ‘graduate’
“It is the most visible agents, from the point of view of the prevailing categories of perception, who are the best placed to change the vision by changing the
categories of perceptions. But they are also, with a few exceptions, the least inclined to do so.”
Why? Because they benefit from the current arrangement. That those in power control the means to power creates a cycle, whereby they reenforce the power
that they have. Bourdieu refers to this as the “circle of symbolic reproduction”.
Symbolic power rests on legitimate recognition your brother-in-law can’t declare you a graduate of the university. The title ‘graduate’ can only be made by
those with legitimate control of symbolic power.
Symbolic order and the power of naming.
Symbolic power can be arrayed along a dimension of intensity/legitimacy:
Insult Official Naming
I-----------------------------------------------I
Low power High Power
We can think about the proliferation of titles in current work and occupations. This rise (sanitary engineer, executive assistant, vice president, e.g.) follows FROM the
desire of groups to NAME THEMSELVES, and thus make their own distinction. The move in contemporary society to provide all with a new name, is a struggle for legitimate power. Racial epithets are the imposition of place by a ruling class on a
ruled class, and when the POWER associated with those epithets can be reversed, then the group has gained the symbolic upper hand.
e.g. minority groups referring to themselves in terms of racial “slurs”—not just the N word—Chinese, Jews, immigrants in
Bourdieu points out that rewards separate a title from a task. Thus, a part-time person doing the same work as a full time person will likely be paid less (even by the
hour) than the person who officially occupies the position. Or, for example, a nurse and a doctor often do exactly the same things, but the doctor will make
more.
Because symbolic power is a useful power, something that can be used to gain resources in multiple dimensions, it is clearly the subject of controversy.
Groups fight over the right to control the naming process.
“Every field is the site of a more or less openly declared struggle for the definition of the legitimate principles of division of the field.” (p.242)
Alliances in the Political Field
Those who occupy similar, but distinct social spaces (or who are in similar, but distinct patterns of social relations) tend to form alliances (though, again,
not necessarily).
How do people at the bottom of a symbolic power system gain capital to change the present point of view?
Bourdieu says it happens through alliances with those who have the ability to control symbols. For example, the intellectuals will ‘embezzle’ symbolic power for
the workers. These alliances occur where there is a similarity in their position in the structure, across dimensions of the structure. Thus, workers are the
dominated group in the production/economic realm, while intellectuals are the dominated group in the cultural realm. The one helps the other because of the
similarity of their situation. For Bourdieu, this was Marx’s error: to look only within the economic realm for the emergence of classes.
Critiques of Bourdieu (general)
too agonistic, too focused on struggle and competition
isn’t Bourdieu himself an example of why he is wrong?
too Parisian, too French, and perhaps too old
Weber’s sociology of religion/culture
Religious cultures provide comprehensible ideas of theodicy and salvation for laypeople
Why did these societies become more rationalized than others? Why did they develop industry, capitalism, democratic governments, corporations, factories, and high technology earlier than the rest of the world?
Why not the
These were all massive, powerful empires. Before the early 19th century, these areas were much more powerful than
Marx does not have a strong answer to this question, but Weber does.
Weber argues that rationalization is associated with capitalism. It is important to keep in mind that capitalism is different from buying and selling things to make a profit. How is it different?
It is different because in capitalism, the money you make is saved up and then invested in new business ventures. This money that is saved and invested is called capital. Since money was invented in Mesopotamia and
Weber’s answer lies in Protestant Christianity, specifically Calvinism, a sect of Protestantism. Weber’s mother was a devout Calvinist, so naturally he knew a lot about this religion.
Most religions in the world at this time were other-worldly
Good moral behavior in this world is rewarded by going to heaven when you die.
For example, in Catholicism, if you paid enough money to the Church, you would be allowed to go to heaven.
Or if you gave money to poor people, you would make God happy.
Or in Hinduism, by having a good reincarnation.
Calvinism was founded by the 16th-century writer and preacher John Calvin. It is different from most religions because in Calvinism, God is all-powerful. Humans cannot change their fate by changing their behavior or paying money to the Church. God decides what will happen to you. You cannot change your fate.
This idea is called predestination. Your destiny is preordained. This is a bit tough on people, because they have no way of knowing whether they will go to heaven or hell. And even if they knew, there would be nothing they could do about it.
So people wanted to know whether they would go to heaven or hell. And they came to believe that an individual’s material success in this world was a sign from God. God must have made some people rich because those people were chosen to go to heaven. So making money became a sign of being chosen by God.
What about poor people?
They are poor because God has not chosen them.
So rich Calvinists did not give their money to the poor. It’s not because they were mean or greedy. They thought God would not want them to give money to people he had chosen to go to hell. It would be a sin to give money to the poor.
It would also be a sin to be self-indulgent, to live a life of luxury. One’s life should be devoted to God, not to oneself.
1) So early Calvinists became very good at making money, because they saw it as a sign of being chosen by God.
2) They did not share their money with the church or with poor people.
3) They did not spend their money on luxuries.
4) They accumulated money and reinvested it in their businesses. And they kept careful accounts of their money, because they believed that making money was a holy endeavour. They made money the way an Imam reads the Koran or a Jewish Rabbi reads the Torah. With total religious intensity.
5) Later generations of Calvinists lost the old religion as they encountered science and modern thought (
They lost their Protestant Ethic, but kept a strong work ethic.
So capitalists were really good at making money, saving money, and doing accounting.
This led to a general rationalization of society in Protestant countries. After all, Calvinists were so good at making money that they ended up owning lots of factories and businesses. And they became powerful in politics. They were in charge.
They owned factories and integrated them, creating large-scale organizations that were independent of the Catholic Church. In
Calvinists encourage personal discipline among all workers. Individuals should be disciplined internally, not by force.
Calvinists encourage precise time scheduling.
They encourage technical competence.
They encourage impersonality in business. Social connections are less important than individual discipline and technical competence.
Keep in mind how different this argument is from Marx’s understanding of society, where religion is an effect of economic processes, not a cause of economic processes.
Emile Durkheim, the father of French sociology, explained religion sociologically. All societies and all religions, he thought, divided the world between the sacred and the profane
The Sacred The Profane (in Latin, profane means “outside the temple”)
Pure Things that are normal
Magical, have special powers Everyday things
Holy Nothing special
Clean Can be dirty; doesn’t matter
Set apart
Contagious—makes you sacred Contagious—makes you unholy if you tough it
Inspires awe, fear, reverence Boring or disgusting
e.g. in Hinduism, cows are sacred; Brahmins are more sacred than untouchables, who are profane and dirty
in Judaism and Islam, pigs are profane
The Koran and the Torah are sacred
Mosques and Synagogues are sacred
Communities, not individuals, draw lines between what’s sacred and what’s profane
These lines are social and cultural
Different communities draw different lines
Communities do rituals so that they can show themselves what is sacred and what is profane
e.g. Baptists, who are a Christian sect in
Hindus bathe in the
Muslims go to
Christians drink the wine and eat the wafer, which symbolize the body and blood of Christ
Durkheim’s functionalism
Durkheim defined totems as objects a community defines as sacred
They can be anything: a piece of wood, a book, a place, a mountain, a building, an animal, a word, even a person
Religions are based on totems, rituals, and on the distinction between the sacred and the profane
Together, these things create a religion, and religions have several functions for society. Religion turns individuals into a community.
1. Social cohesion
religion unites people
defines what is ethical, defines the rules of the game of life
religion channels our emotions (love, hatred)
2. Social control
Elites can control people through religion
Religion encourages conformity
Religion makes the political system seem legitimate
3. Meaning and purpose
For individuals, religion makes life meaningful
We are all going to die, and we are all going to suffer many times in our live, even the lucky ones like us; religion makes death and suffering meaningful and thus less painful
For Durkheim, “God” is another word for “society”
Introduction to Sociological Theory
Prof. Gabe Ignatow
Review Sheet for Mid-term Exam II. (March 26 in class)
The 2nd mid-term exam will cover the course readings and lectures from Bourdieu through cultural theory.
You should be able to define and discuss all of the following terms:
Social space
Power field
Economic capital
Social capital
Cultural capital
Symbolic capital
Class reproduction
“habitus”
“Class Dismissed”
Max Weber
“Railroad Switchman”
Theodicy
Salvation
Calvinism
Other-worldly religion
This-worldly religion
Accounting
Predestination
Rationalization
The calling
The Protestant Ethic
Work ethic
Emile Durkheim
The Elementary Forms…
Aborigines and Native Americans
The Sacred
The Profane
Rituals
Totems
“Collective Effervescence”
Social Solidarity
1. “Economic Liberalism”
This is not an economics course, but we can discuss the basic principles of what is sometimes known as “Anglo-Saxon” or “Anglo-American” or “laissez-faire” capitalism, and its transformation.
Adam Smith: the “invisible hand” of the market provides goods and services for all of us.
Free trade is good because, since individuals are rational and self-interested, and tend to negotiate and trade and bargain, and because whenever people trade or buy goods or services both parties must gain (most of the time), governments should allow free trade. Governments should not interfere in the market.
Economic liberalism thus gave priority to economic freedom over economic equality
Liberal capitalism was the official economic system, and the economic backbone, of the British Empire, and it was the dominant global system until the early 20th century and the rise of communism and socialism, and crises of capitalism including the 1929 stock market crash.
The result of these crises and threats, in advanced capitalist democracies, was that the state sought to smooth out the volatility of markets, and sought to make capitalism serve social purposes – equality and welfare.
The result was not communism, but rather the “welfare state” in which states taxed citizens, and taxed the wealthiest citizens more than others, in order to provide health insurance, unemployment insurance, retirement benefits, and other benefits to vulnerable citizens.
The welfare state was the dominant economic-social model in the world from about 1945-1975(ish). This period also saw the growth of labor unions, which were generally not communist/socialist, but that demanded guarantees of social security and benefits from states.
In the 1970s the welfare state and unions faced their own crises and also sustained intellectual/ideological criticism from “neo-liberal” economists and other writers.
The welfare state was, and is, threatened by global economic competitition, by economic globalization and the incorporation of countries like China into the global economy. States that tax businesses and citizens for social reasons lose because businesses and citizens can more easily move. E.g. Germany and France today.
Thus economic globalization / neo-liberalism directly threatens the welfare state, and in so doing it threatens the welfare of millions of people in advanced democracies. For these and other reasons, we should not be surprised to find anti-globalization social movements, and anti-globalization and anti-immigration sentiments among voters in advanced democracies. And yet economic globalization / neoliberalism continues to advance, and welfare states continue to shrink. Why? Peter Martin and Martin Wolf argue that there is a strong moral case for economic globalization. Their arguments are classical arguments of free-traders and economic globalizers, and most business executives would strongly agree with them. Their arguments are rooted in neoclassical economics and in observations of the world, particularly since the 1990s.
Peter Martin “The Moral Case for Globalization”
This article was originally published in the Financial Times, a highbrow business newspaper. For Martin, economic globalization is morally good. In fact it is great, because it has integrated previously marginalized, poor people into the world economy and provided them with higher standards of living.
Economic globalization is better and more powerful than bureaucratic elites and their “North-South dialogues”. Economic globalization is real, powerful, and beneficial because it will transfer power from developed countries to developing ones.
Leftist critics of globalization (the anti-globalization movement) are in fact conservative, they want to retain the status quo.
Economic globalization refers to the lowering of trade barriers and the liberalization of economic policies and labor laws.
Economic globalization creates losers, but it creates more winners than losers.
Economic globalization creates jobs. Millions of jobs. Maybe not great jobs, but a job in a factory is better than no job at all.
Globalization can be stopped, but this requires a more powerful state that can repress individual rights and freedoms. This is undemocratic.
Economic globalization / liberalization is associated with democracy. Where we have free trade, we will generally have democracy and more freedoms.
This is a “mainstream” view of globalization. For evidence it relies on the economic development of southeast Asia – Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Vietnam
Martin Wolf “Why this Hatred of the Market?”
Technology has made the lives of millions of people much better. It is easier to travel, to communicate.
Governments are forced to open their economies to the world economy, although this leads to a loss of power and control. Why do they do this? Because choosing economic isolation leads to disasters, e.g. East Germany, North Korea, and Maoist China (poor, isolated, militaristic) versus West Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan (rich, successful, not militaristic).
Still, some people resist economic globalization. Why?
Hatred of markets
Fear of foreigners
Concern about wages and jobs
These fears are unfounded, “mythical”
What is not mythical is the economic prosperity of … east Asia
Other criticisms of economic globalization
Neoliberalism / economic globalization weakens unions and the welfare state, both of which are institutions that gave millions of citizens opportunities to attain a middle-class standard of living, and to live and grow old free of the fear of poverty or destitution. These institutions created an important “safety net” for citizens of advanced democracies, and now it seems that this safety net is weakening.
There are other criticisms of economic globalization that are less focused on the wealthy democratic societies.
Hugo Radice “Neoliberal Globalisation: Imperialism Without Empires”
This chapter is from a book that is generally opposed to neoliberalism / economic globalization. The packet we are using in this class is generally in favor of it.
HR focuses on political power, on imperialism or “Empire”
He argues that economic globalization isn’t opposed to states, it doesn’t weaken states, but rather it complements state power, and thus states encourage EG (compare this position with Ohmae’s later on)
“North-South” language, much like Wallerstein
Wars by the North are done to protect Northern interests
2nd-to-last page: argues against the “weakening” or “rolling back” of the state – different in the North and South (he does not expand on this here)
Essentially, he sees neoliberalism as something that the rich and powerful North does to the poor and weak South
Kenichi Ohmae “Putting Global Logic First”
Ohmae is a highbrow business writer (for the Economist)
He is famous as a “regionalist”
We will read him again later
He would disagree entirely with Radice, I think, and he also disagrees at several points with Huntington
He argues that today it is economic activity, not nation-states, that defines the landscape on which all other institutions must operate
The nation-state is an “artefact” of the 18th and 19th centuries
The N-S is “crumbling” because of:
ethnic tensions
religious hatreds
political resentments
“Devolution” in Germany, Spain, UK, Canada, France
This is not only due to the end of the Cold War (Huntington)
The crumbling of the N-S is due to international flows of capital, e.g. in currency markets, which cannot be controlled by states
Global flows of information, models of consumption, create pressures on states to open markets to foreign goods and services
The N-S does not support economic growth, it inhibits it (against Radice and others) because politicians must meet the extortionate demands of labor unions, farmers, fishermen, other groups
States must provide an equal “civil minimum” of services for all citizens, regardless of economic logic
e.g. they send cash to rural areas for unneeded projects
(e.g. expensive bridges to small islands in the US, Japan)
The invisible hand of the global market will inevitably punish this kind of behavior
So N-Ss are “unnatural” and even “dysfunctional” in the global economy
If Coca-Cola or Nike acted like states, they would go bankrupt
Region-States do make sense
e.g. Seattle-Vancouver, Silicon Valley, expanded Hong Kong, northern Italy, San Diego-Tijuana
These are “growth regions” incorporating several cities, 5-20 million people (but not 50 or 100 million), with an airport and an international seaport
Unlike states, region-states must be “open” to global economic realities
welcome foreign investment
foreign ownership
foreign products
Region-states do not protect the “civil minimum” or protect uncompetitive industries (as do irrational nation-states)
Region-states are the present and the future because they are rational and open to global realities, because they put “global logic” first
Robert Hunter Wade “The Disturbing Rise in Poverty and Inequality”
R.H. Wade is a professor of political economy at the LSE
Counterposes the arguments of economic liberals (globalizers) and anti-globalizers
Suggests that liberal optimism (of Peter Martin, Martin Wolf, others) is probably wrong
problems with how the world bank calculates income and poverty
it is possible that the proportion of the world population in poverty has decreased over 20 years because of economic growth in China and India
Inequality of wealth and income is also hard to measure and calculate. It is usually done with a GINI index:
XXX
In US dollars, global inequality has certainly increased. But this is not meaningful due to differences in purchasing power (lower prices for goods and services in poorer areas)
If we use PPP measurements, world income inequality has increased over the last 20 years (the ‘neoliberal era’), both across and within countries
More people are living at the ends of the world income distribution, and more money is going to those at the top
Inequality between nations may not be important if everyone is better off overall (who cares?)
But inequality between states may matter more than we think
leads elites in poor states to compare themselves with elites in rich states
leads elites to buy more high-end foreign products
leads to elite corruption
leads to emigration by educated elites
The world economy is more regionalized than globalized – most Fortune 500 companies have a regional, but not global, focus
They can pay higher labor prices because they need skilled workers, but relatively small numbers of them
These high-wage (high-tech) companies are clustered in regional networks, in which valuable technical and tacit information flows relatively freely
Even in non-Japan East Asia, there is almost no R&D today
Global Cities / Globalization and Cities
Saskia Sassen “Whose City Is It?” (packet)
The UN estimates that as of 2007, more than half of the world population lived in cities.
There is a large literature, with some famous names, on how technology and globalization forces are transforming cities. Usually this is discussed in terms of:
A) Global cities
a. A global network of cities that are not very attached to their local surroundings
b. Tokyo, New York, London
Measured in terms of internet and financial activity and linkages, the “global cities” are usually listed as:
NY, Toronto, Chicago, Houston, SF, LA, Mexico City, Miami
Caracas, Rio, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires
London, Paris, Madrid, Vienna, Milan
Johannesburg
Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, Bangkok, Sydney
B) Globalization and cities
a. Communications technology, immigration
Manuell Castells is one of the big names in this area, and has written about the “Network Society” or the ‘information society’ or ‘informational capitalism’
He is a bit of a futurist, and celebrates “informationalism” and the advance of genetic engineering
Like other network theorists, he argues that flows of information across social and professional networks have become, in a sense, more important than organizational size or power.
The state, political parties, churches, and unions become less important. Each individual’s position with respect to global flows of information is what largely determines their life outcomes.
Thus Castells has written about the “fourth World”: a series of “black holes of informational capitalism,” areas that have been cut off from the flow of wealth and information in the global economy
Also known as the “digital divide,” although Castells’ conceptualization is more complex
Saskia Sassen has also written in a very general way about what happens to cities under conditions of economic globalization and advanced communications technologies.
In “Whose City is It?” she lists the world’s major financial and business centers: NY, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, LA, Sydney, Hong Kong…
Information and money flow between these cities in huge amounts, and they grow wealthier exponentially without necessarily transferring that wealth to other cities in their countries, or to poorer rural areas (thus we see mass internal migration to cities, as in the Dogan article).
These concentrations of wealth in global cities amount to a “transnational urban system” that needs to be understood not in terms of individual cities, but globally, as a system
Keep in mind Leslie Sklair’s argument on the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC)
Thus the world now has a geography of “centrality and marginality,” of center and periphery. But so, increasingly, do cities. Globalization forces are transforming cities from within. This is in stark contrast to the predictions of internet advocates in the 1990s, who argued that the internet would allow people to move out of cities and to work from home. The internet would bring the urban world out to rural areas, and would therefore increase informational equality. It would be a democratic force. It hasn’t quite worked out that way.
In global cities, downtowns and metropolitan business centers thrive.
But manufacturing leaves urban centers.
Meanwhile low- and middle-income residents are starved for resources.
“National territory” within cities has been “denationalized,” that is it can be bought and sold on international markets ever more easily. This creates pressures on local residents (poor and middle class especially).
This leads to increasing inequality not only globally, but within cities, and ultimately to “brutalization” and conflicts, such as the riots in Paris this year.
Poorer city residents can now also organize globally, in terms of ethnic and religious identities (e.g. Islamic fundamentalism). But it is difficult for such movements to compete given global economic realities.
Sociology 4260: Global Society Prof. Gabe Ignatow
This list is not exhaustive. You should be able to intelligently discuss all of these terms, plus show your familiarity with all of the readings from this section of the course.
The exam will be in class on Tuesday, March 24. The format will be the same as for the first exam.
Mid-term Exam 2 Review Sheet
Economic Liberalism
Laissez-faire capitalism
“invisible hand”
Adam Smith
Economic freedom
Economic equality
Communism
Socialism
Liberal capitalism
Crises of liberal capitalism
The welfare state
Social security
Pensions
“Keynesianism”
Crises of the welfare state
Stagflation
Oil embargo
Neo-classical economics
Think tanks
Neoliberalism
Anti-globalization social movements
The “
Peter Martin
Martin Wolfe
Xenophobia
Racism
Hatred of markets
“race to the bottom”
Inequality within nations
Inequality between nations
Neo-colonialism
Kenichi Ohmae
Nation-states
Region-states
“Global logic”
“extortionate demands”
Foreign investment
Foreign ownership
Foreign products
“civil minimum”
Robert Hunter Wade
Measurement of poverty
Measurement of inequality
GINI index
Elite consumption in developing nations
Clustering of high-wage industries, R&D
Global Cities
Megacities
Saskia Sassen
Service jobs
agglomeration
Gentrification
Centrality and marginality
Caglar Keyder
Urban assimilation
