Monday, August 4, 2008

Lecture Notes for Cultural Theory 4260 Final Exam

Undergrads, these notes are not complete, and contain material that we may not have gone over in class. They should be used in addition to your class notes and the readings, not as a replacement for them.

GI

Pierre Bourdieu, Snobs, and Omnivores


Bourdieu
àsymbolic boundaries, quantitative techniques for sociology of culture (compare with cultural anthro)

Working-class background, studied the Kabyle in Algeria while a soldier

Became more politically active later in his career: anti-globalization, anti-Americanization to some degree

Rejected Marxism, but also post-positivism

Main ideas:

Forms of capital (social, economic, cultural)

Social Space or Field

Habitus: bodily and cognitive imprint of social position

Why workers don’t like to eat fish (removing bones too dainty) or work on keyboards

Categories of refined/unrefined versus masculine/feminine

Symbolic Violence, Symbolic Domination

Distinction (excerpt)

Pierre Bourdieu is perhaps the most influential sociologist alive today. Like Foucault before him, in France he is widely regarded as a “master thinker,” although he is unlike Foucault in that he is a tried-and-true sociologist, who uses numerical data and advanced statistics in his research.

For the purposes of this course, we’ll cover some of his work on Structure, Habitus, and Social Space, and then we’ll move on to Michele Lamont’s revision and extension of his ideas.

Social Space and Social Classes.

Bourdieu's Opponents:

(1) A break with Marxists: (I.e. 'objective' reality). Bourdieu is interested in RELATIONSHIPS, on more levels than just the economic, and argues that how people

interpret and make sense of their relations matters (this is the subjective element).

(2) A break with "intellectualism": The theoretical class (i.e. the one we as scientists define) is not necessarily the class that exists in-the-world.

(3) A break with Economics: There are more dimensions to the social world that just economics.

(4) A break with “Objectivism” in favor of a symbolic understanding of social structure.

He also has s definite focus on POWER STRUGGLES.

Social Space: A geographic/mathematical metaphor for how people are arranged in society. Bourdieu defines social space as:

"a (multi-dimensional) space constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active in the social

universe under consideration, that is, able to confer force or power on their possessor in that universe." (p.229).

The points to keep in mind with this def:

(1) Social space has multiple dimensions (ex economic, educational, cultural, etc.: n dimensions) These dimensions can usually be categorized as a form of

Capital.

(2) "...constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution..." This mean that how

much and what kind of the particular capital one has is the basis for sorting along the dimensions.

(3) "...by the set of properties active in the social universe under consideration, that is, able to confer

force or power on their possessor in that universe." The quantity or quality (i.e. point 2) of a given good only matters to the extent that the good in question

is 'active' in the social world of interest. This part of the definition implies an element of contextual specificity. Two groups' relative position depend on the

particular 'field' that is active. If we're dealing in the economic field, then the relative position of $$ matters, if we're dealing with the educational, then

that's what matters. [note, that this discussion is about one dimension at a time, Bourdieu does not think that way - this is for illustration only, the point is that in

some struggles, the relative value of a given dimension will change.].

Power follows from the ability to mobilize capital.

The social space is a field of forces -- the system of relations, alliances, and power struggles. His vision of social space is NOT one that is (necessarily)

static, but instead constantly infused with power struggles. Thus we see the world as a system of 'objective power relations.'

Is this paranoid? Overdramatic??

This allows us to see the social world in two ways, as the positions themselves thusly: (take culture and econ as examples)

Hi Culture

|

| A

|

|

Poor ---------------------------- Rich

|

| B

c |

|

Low Culture

In this picture, the three groups are arrayed on these two dimensions (thus C is poor and holds mainly 'low culture' values, A is rich with 'high culture' , etc).

Because these positions are at the same time relations, because domination follows from the ability to utilize this capital, we could instead view this picture

as:

A -> B-----> C

\ _____/

Where A dominates (a little) B, and both B and A dominate C. What Bourdieu wants to claim is that these systems of relations are in constant contest -- not ONLY

in who gets to be WHERE, but what having a certain quantity/distribution of a good GIVES you, ie what it MEANS.

The dimensions are the elements that give power (education, money, social contacts, etc) in general, these elements form types of CAPITAL. The four

general types of capital for Bourdieu are:

1.Economic Capital: How much money one has.

2.Cultural Capital: The systems of value and meaning a person can draw on, what counts as 'good' for a group. (the main distinction is between

high and low culture for Bourdieu, thus the difference between a person who listens to Garth brooks and goes to the bowling alley every weekend versus a

person who reads Shakespeare, drinks fine wine, and goes to the museum all the time).

3.Social Capital: The set of relations one can draw on: who you know that MATTERS.

4.Symbolic Capital. : the extent to which one has the power to institute, to NAME, to define who is who. Symbolic power rests on RECOGNITION, i.e., give or take, legitimacy (Weber).

Bourdieu argues that each of these types of capital is transformable (to some extent), i.e. able to be converted and reconverted, one to the other. Thus if you have enough money you might get to know a new

set of important people, etc.

The two dimensions along which each type of capital are arrayed is Volume and composition. Thus the AMOUNT of money one has, and the TYPE of

money matter (i.e. cash vs stocks vs gold vs land).

Classes on Paper:

On the basis of the distribution of the various forms of capital, we can find groups of people who have 'similar' distributions. These are 'classes' in the

logical sense -- people who occupy the same cell in a cross-tabulation. BUT, we can't necessarily assume that these classes are self-recognized. This is the

long standing differentiation between classes in-themselves vs. classes for themselves.

What exists is a space of relations, out of which may or may not emerge a class per se.

We can compare this to Marx’s theories of class, in which he assumes that groups form from similarity, but it does not explain how the groups form. Instead, through a theoretical ‘slight of hand’, the

essential questions are spirited away:

We don’t ask about the political work needed to organize and created a self-recognized, mobilized class

Don’t explain how the formal ‘classes’ of social scientists are related to the actual, living classes in society.

Classes and class fragments develop “habituses”—roughly but not quite subcultures

The Perception of the social world and political struggle.

One must account for how actors see the world to make sense of how they act. That is, we ned to look to the social construction of identity.

One's perspective in the world is due to two things:

1) 'Objective': People see the world differently because they occupy a different space in the world.

2) 'subjective': The tools brought to bear, the language used, are all the products of previous struggles, and influence the meaning of the very dimensions

that people array themselves along.

Thus, not only are people seeing the world from different spaces, but the very view of that space, the relevant value of any given quantity/quality

distribution is different depending on a group's past history of struggle.

While Bourdieu argues that people TEND to accept the position they find themselves in, there is social change, and it comes from struggles for power related

to (1) and (2).

in an earlier essay, Bourdieu writes

“Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories which make it possible, are the stake par excellence of the political struggle, a struggle

which is inseparably theoretical and practical, over the power of preserving or transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of

perception of that world.”

These are social categories: racial, social class, economic categories, that change over time

So being able to define the dimensions of status, to identify the subject of political debate and shape the way issues are seen to be related are all symbolic actions,

and they are the means through which politics are carried out. Thus, being able to control these means gives one control of political outcomes. The power of

naming is crucial.

Examples:

? Political rhetoric about abortion: proponents use ‘right-to-choose’ language, opponents use ‘rights-to-life’ language.

? Use of the word ‘Liberal’ in presidential campaigns

Symbolic Capital: Any capital when it is perceived by an agent as self-recognized power to name, to make distinctions.

It follows that objective power relations reproduce themselves in symbolic power.

The power to create titles

Citizenship is bestowed by the government,

The definition of ‘adult’ or ‘graduate’

“It is the most visible agents, from the point of view of the prevailing categories of perception, who are the best placed to change the vision by changing the

categories of perceptions. But they are also, with a few exceptions, the least inclined to do so.”

Why? Because they benefit from the current arrangement. That those in power control the means to power creates a cycle, whereby they reenforce the power

that they have. Bourdieu refers to this as the “circle of symbolic reproduction”.

Symbolic power rests on legitimate recognition your brother-in-law can’t declare you a graduate of the university. The title ‘graduate’ can only be made by

those with legitimate control of symbolic power.

Symbolic order and the power of naming.

Symbolic power can be arrayed along a dimension of intensity/legitimacy:

Insult Official Naming

I-----------------------------------------------I

Low power High Power

We can think about the proliferation of titles in current work and occupations. This rise (sanitary engineer, executive assistant, vice president, e.g.) follows FROM the

desire of groups to NAME THEMSELVES, and thus make their own distinction. The move in contemporary society to provide all with a new name, is a struggle for legitimate power. Racial epithets are the imposition of place by a ruling class on a

ruled class, and when the POWER associated with those epithets can be reversed, then the group has gained the symbolic upper hand.

e.g. minority groups referring to themselves in terms of racial “slurs”—not just the N word—Chinese, Jews, immigrants in America (greenhorns, FOBs)

Bourdieu points out that rewards separate a title from a task. Thus, a part-time person doing the same work as a full time person will likely be paid less (even by the

hour) than the person who officially occupies the position. Or, for example, a nurse and a doctor often do exactly the same things, but the doctor will make

more.

Because symbolic power is a useful power, something that can be used to gain resources in multiple dimensions, it is clearly the subject of controversy.

Groups fight over the right to control the naming process.

“Every field is the site of a more or less openly declared struggle for the definition of the legitimate principles of division of the field.” (p.242)

Alliances in the Political Field

Those who occupy similar, but distinct social spaces (or who are in similar, but distinct patterns of social relations) tend to form alliances (though, again,

not necessarily).

How do people at the bottom of a symbolic power system gain capital to change the present point of view?

Bourdieu says it happens through alliances with those who have the ability to control symbols. For example, the intellectuals will ‘embezzle’ symbolic power for

the workers. These alliances occur where there is a similarity in their position in the structure, across dimensions of the structure. Thus, workers are the

dominated group in the production/economic realm, while intellectuals are the dominated group in the cultural realm. The one helps the other because of the

similarity of their situation. For Bourdieu, this was Marx’s error: to look only within the economic realm for the emergence of classes.

Critiques of Bourdieu (general)

too agonistic, too focused on struggle and competition

isn’t Bourdieu himself an example of why he is wrong?

too Parisian, too French, and perhaps too old

Michelle Lamont: Money, Morals, & Manners

Symbolic Boundaries and Status

The study of “symbolic boundaries” and “cultural repertoires” is an important theoretical area within cultural studies, and it is mostly a French-American venture.

Lamont’s research is especially qualitative and interpretive. Her writings are based mostly on interviews she has conducted over the years with, e.g., middle class Americans and French citizens, working class Americans and others.

Lamont is from Quebec, which is a part of Canada with a heavy French influence, so she has been able to investigate two cultures—the Anglo-American world and France and French Canada—from a unique perspective.

Her theoretical ideas:

“symbolic boundaries” the types of lines that individuals draw when they categorize other people

“high-status signals”

“boundary work” work of maintaining distinctions between one’s own group and other groups

Types of symbolic boundaries

moral boundaries

drawn on the basis of moral character

honesty, work ethic, integrity, consideration for others

socioeconomic boundaries

wealth, power, professional success

cultural boundaries

education, intelligence, manners, taste, command of high culture

People in different countries value these boundaries differently. For example in America moral and socioeconomic qualities are more highly valued, while in France culture is more important

In both countries socioeconomic boundary work seems to be on the upswing

e.g. New Yorkers seeing Midwesterners as parochial

Businessmen seeing intellectuals as unrealistic

accountants, bankers, marketing executives, realtors

Social and cultural specialists seeing businesspeople as materialistic

e.g. artists, social workers, priests, psychologists, researchers, teachers

French seeing Americans as puritan moralists

She compares American and French members of the upper middle class

Midwesterners versus New Yorkers

Parisians versus residents of Clermont-Ferrand

Businesspeople versus social and cultural specialists


So Bourdieu looks at the social world and sees groups in conflict over forms of capital, attempting to reproduce their capital in their children, and struggling over symbols that define their existence. Naturally, one wonders whether his ideas reflect social reality, say, in France, or if he’s right about France, perhaps the situation is different in the U.S. Does having “refined tastes” in art, music, wine, home decorations and so on mean as much in the U.S. as it does in France? Maybe it does in some regions more so than in others (e.g. rural versus urban areas, Los Angeles versus Boston).

Questions like these are Michele Lamont’s starting point. To answer these questions, she employs a number of concepts, most of which are not terribly original (and many of which overlap):

1) symbolic boundaries, boundary work

2) high-status signals

3) evaluative criteria, “criteria of purity” (Mary Douglas)

4) cultural resources versus structural situations

5) structures of thought that organize perceptions of others (think of Foucault’s modes of objectification and dividing practices, and of Berger and Luckmann)

Her method is the individual interview—not the statistical analysis of survey data: Bourdieu’s method—which tends to corroborate a view of “boundary work” that is more individualistic than Bourdieu’s analyses of “social space.”

Her main findings:

1) symbolic boundaries and “boundary work”

looser boundaries in U.S., less consensus

moral boundaries are important, and Bourdieu ignores them

moral and socioeconomic boundaries are more important in the U.S., but are on the rise in both countries

cultural boundaries are clearer and stronger in France

symbolic boundaries are nation-level phenomena: there’s less regional variation within countries than one would think (NY versus Indianapolis, Paris versus Clermont-Ferand)

“social trajectory” matters a lot in people’s evaluative criteria, i.e. upwardly versus downwardly mobile (Bourdieu does not overlook this at all, though)

cultural specialists versus for-profit workers: occupational area matters a lot more in the U.S. than in France; overall capital matters more in France

Much of this is likely due to the high level of geographical mobility in the U.S.

Diverse ways of experiencing high culture—more emotional, social, “self-actualization” in U.S.; more expressly intellectual in France

Excerpt from film “The Dinner Game”


Bethany Bryson

“Anything But Heavy Metal”: Symbolic Exclusion and Musical Dislikes

Music has many roles in social life, creating solidarities and encouraging political resistance.

People engage with music in many different ways in different areas of life.

Music becomes part of people’s identities, the way they identify themselves and draw closer to or else distance themselves from other groups and individuals.

While social exclusion is a well-understood sociological phenomenon, “symbolic exclusion” is the topic of Bryson’s paper. Symbolic exclusion is, in a word, taste.

Symbolic exclusion is a form of Lamont’s boundary work, the work of drawing lines between ourselves and others so as to establish our place in the social world.

Bryson examines musical exclusion and musical tolerance

From Bourdieu, we expect that elites will behave in a snobbish manner regarding music and musical tastes, excluding, or discriminating against, certain types of lowbrow music

Yet the opposite seems to be true: highly educated people are more musically tolerant than are people with less education, that is they are more open to more different kinds of music

Yet she finds that educated people are more tolerant generally but also very intolerant to low-status music, or music associated with uneducated people, such as country or gospel music in the United States

She calls this patterned tolerance

She refers to multicultural capital

Hypotheses

High Status Exclusiveness (wealth, education, occup prestige)à dislike more genres (not confirmed)

Educated Tolerance Educationà fewer dislikes

Symbolic Racism: Racist Whites will dislike non-white music (confirmed)

Patterned Tolerance: People who dislike few genres will dislike those types of music associated with people with less education

College students don’t listen to, or they say they dislike: heavy metal, rap, gospel, country

There exists a “Tolerance Line” between high-statues cosmopolitanism and low-status group-based cultures

The Sociology of Culture and Cultural Production

Philip Smith, 167-182

Richard Peterson, Why 1955? Explaining the Advent of Rock Music (in reader)

This is a different area of cultural studies from what we have seen so far in this course, although it resembles in some ways Horkheimer and Adorno’s Critical Theory, as it is focused on cultural products including mass media and popular culture—music, films, television, novels etc.

We can call this perspective the production perspective

Less abstract than much of the theory we have dealt with so far, less general, philosophical

More concrete

This is good and bad, depending on your appetite for social and cultural theory, which can be visionary, imaginative, and sometimes difficult

The Production Perspective is a current approach; that is people are using it and developing it today to study things they care about

The production perspective covers several fields, including communications, media studies, and sociology

When we talk about culture here, we are talking about

Culture as an institutional sphere devoted to the making of meaning

i.e. art, music, theater, fashion, literature, religion, the media, education

This definition is from William Sewell, from the start of the course

So culture here is not values or ideas or beliefs or rituals or identities (as in cultural studies and other areas)

In the production perspective scholars study the culture industries, although they do so more carefully than Horkheimer and Adorno ever did

RECEPTION STUDIES

Remember how Horkheimer and Adorno imagined audiences, i.e. the reception of culture…?

For Critical Theorists, audiences are basically passive, “narcotized” – they accept whatever popular cultural products are spoon-fed to them

We still see evidence of this kind of Marx-ish understanding of reception in the British Cultural Studies tradition

you will remember the ideas of dominant reading and oppositional reading

People actually go out and study how people receive mass media, for example how people from different class backgrounds interpret television shows that are very nationalistic

How people can creatively and reflexively interpret cultural products

How people actually watch TV or read in their everyday lives

Together, these sorts of studies lead us to question Critical Theory’s model of the passive consumer

e.g. “Watching Dallas”

Dallas was incredibly popular.

On the other, cultural critics often regarded Dallas as a threat to authentic national cultures and national identities.

e.g. in 1983 Jack Lang, the French Minister of Culture, proclaimed Dallas as the “symbol of American cultural imperialism”

Since Horkheimer and Adorno, and before them as well, “professional intellectuals” have been dismissive of American-style consumer culture. Many analysts see popular culture as not just entertainment. They think it has obvious, manipulative ideological effects.

Ien Ang studied the reception of Dallas in the Netherlands, and found that many people who enjoyed watching the show also disapproved of its capitalistic ideology. Some people defended watching it with a populist anti-intellectual discourse. Others adopted an ironic stance toward the show.

So reactions in Holland were complex, to say the least.

Katz and Liebes, two American-Israeli social scientists, studied the reception of Dallas among lower middle class Israeli citizens. Their groups included:

Israeli Arabs

New immigrants from Russia

Immigrants from Morocco

Kibbutzniks

These were compared to similar groups in Los Angeles

They watched the show, then participated in an “open structured” discussion and filled out questionnaires.

They found that people interpreted the show in very different ways, sometimes incorrectly.

Some of the Moroccan Jews claimed that the show made them more proud of their Jewish identity and their moral standards (as compared with the Dallas characters, many of whom are “bastards”)

They conclude that the discourses of ordinary people about Dallas were quite sophisticated, so we should be skeptical about discussions of cultural imperialism and passive audiences.

Also we learn to think carefully about the “mass” audience, which is not as uniform in its interpretations and the way cultural products are consumed as some theories suggest

How do people interpret the Coca Cola/Turkey commercial? How do people in Turkey watch and interpret MTV?

The Production of Culture

The “production perspective”

Alternative to strict market-based accounts of culture industries

H&A: the “culture industry” (singular)—shapes our knowledge and interpretation of current events, other cultures, international opinion of the United States

So much for cultural reception studies.

Why do people watch certain movies, certain kinds of movies, with certain themes?

Why are certain forms of music, television, film, and literature popular in certain places at certain times?

Where do museums come from? Concert halls? Libraries? Monuments? War memorials?

Sociologists discuss certain categories of people: gatekeepers and sponsors

Gatekeepers are taste-makers who work within and outside corporations to separate out certain cultural products (films, bands, songs, actors, television shows) because they believe they will become popular and profitable. These people work as agents, and for media corporations. They have to be hip, on the cutting edge of fashions.

Sponsors are wealthy and powerful individuals and organizations who provide resources (money, social and political connections) to promote certain cultural products and projects (museums, orchestras, theatres) that suit their tastes and interests. Sponsors include wealthy patrons, municipal governments, and even states.

At different times, due to social, technological and economic changes, different networks of sponsors and gatekeepers can emerge, leading to cultural changes and the popularization of new genres of art and music (e.g. impressionist painting in the early 19th century, which was initially rejected).

Richard Peterson, Why 1955? Explaining the Advent of Rock Music

Rock music, or some form of it, is a nearly universal form of music. Where did it come from? Why? And why did it begin in 1955? If we are interested in these sorts of questions, a production of culture perspective can be very useful, as it is very concrete, pointing to specific social, economic, and technological processes that shape what we listen to, eat, and watch.

In 1955 a rock aesthetic replaced the jazz aesthetic in American popular music

Frank Sinatra, Nat King Cole, Tony Bennett, Perry Como à Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, Buddy Holly, Little Richard, and many more

Can we use a supply side explanation to account for this change? That is, people like Elvis Presley came and revolutionized the music scene?

But at any given time there are many creative, special talents, most of whom do not get recognized

What about a demand side explanation? That is, at some points in time there are major demographic changes, e.g. more young people, and they demand different kinds of music and other cultural products that reflect their own lives, not the lives of their parents’ generation. People want music that speaks to them.

In the case of rock music, the oldest of the baby-boomers was only 9 years old in 1955.

Richard Peterson argues that it was changes in the commercial culture industry itself that led to the popularity of rock music. These changes were legal and technological and business changes.

1909 “United States Copyright Law”—protected artists from sheet-music companies

ASCAP—American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers—formed to collect royalties from public performances—dominant by 1930s

As late as 1950 an oligopoly of only 18 music publishers controlled all the music which could reach the public ear. Everything.

The ASCAP oligopoly produced safe, smooth, melodic music with muted jazz rhythms and harmonies.

The work of black musicians in the blues, jazz, and r&b and later soul was excluded, as was Latin and country music. These musical forms were only for local audiences, and were not national.

In 1939 BMI, a new licensing agency, was formed by radio networks, but could not induce publishers and songwriters to defect from ASCAP. So instead, they began signing black, Latin, and country music singers and songwriters.

ASCAP, the musical oligarchy, failed to come to terms with radio networks over licensing fees in 1939, so these networks turned to BMI and began to provide exposure to black, Latin, and country music, although change was slow and rock had not yet been invented.

Technology and Patent Law

Columbia (12-inch, 33 1/3 rpm LPs) versus RCA (7-inch, 45 rpm)

Deal between two brokered by government

RCA small disks are durable, can be shipped by mail, hold singles, allowed for musical experimentation

1947—FCC approves more broadcasting stations

Popularization of TV and transistor radio—cheaply made by Japanese—encourages “Top 40” radio format


Paul DiMaggio, Market Structure, the Creative Process, and Popular Culture (in reader)

Here we have a more general article presenting ways of theorizing popular culture, and contrasting these to purely economic approaches and other approaches. This is typical of economic sociology, another area in which Paul DiMaggio is active.

He is generally concerned with the quality of cultural products available to the public. This informs his research on museums and other cultural institutions.

Discusses “mass society” and “mass culture” arguments about popular culture, which like Critical Theory itself presume a decline in the quality of cultural products available to, in this case, Americans

abundance, diversity, vitality à homogeneity, blandness, triviality

rationalization, individualization and alienation, creation of big national markets and homogeneous tastes and preferences

Mass culture is criticized by both cultural conservatives and radicals

conservatives: mass culture uses sex and violence to make money (the lowest common denominator), does not respect traditional religious values

radicals argue that elites create bland, dumb mass culture products to encourage people to consume uncritically

e.g. Critical Theory, Habermas and the “colonization of the life world”

Innovation becomes rare as market forces rule: cultural products must appeal to the lowest common denominator, base urges…and large markets

DiMaggio argues that Mass Culture theories rest on one of two simplistic economic assumptions

free market assumption: what the public wants, the public will get (conservative)

monopoly assumption: a few organizations control cultural production and dictate taste (radical)

But there’s absolutely nothing concrete about these sorts of assumptions, and this is where a bit of sociological realism is needed. Real cultural products (books, movies, television programs, music) are produced by for-profit organizations that face the constraints of the market. Some are produced by not-for-profit organizations that face other constraints and pressures.

But, then again, some culture industries seem to follow the mass culture model. Others seem to follow a niche or specialization model.

books, records, films, television programs

versus

television programs, mass-circulation magazines, school textbooks, mass-market paperback novels

What determines the form of particular culture industries, and the degree of creativity they allow artists?

DiMaggio follows Peterson and others in arguing that degree of oligopoly in a culture industry is the key to understanding its degree of creativity and innovation versus homogeneity

DiMaggio wants to know if this is true for the culture industries as a whole, not just for popular music

Makes a few assumptions

Managers in culture industries want to create predictability, reduce uncertainty

Latent Demand for a diverse range of cultural products

Innovation comes from below (from artists), is not really encouraged by culture industry bureaucracies

So he argues that managers in culture industries want to control markets, to prevent competitors from entering them, and to control creative talent so that they create cultural products in a regular, predictable, efficient way

So American television executives (only three networks) had been able to control their industry for a long time (until cable and satellite TV), while the recording industry has had uneven success at doing this

Brokerage Systems of Administration

Brokers – essentially agents who represent artists to corporations, and corporations to artists, but generally work for the corporation

Entrepreneurial Brokers – brokers do not work for culture industry firms

Centralized Brokers – network television, textbooks

See Table on p. 160

DiMaggio finds that, generally, culture industries have become less concentrated over the last few decades due partly to technology (cable and satellite TV, CDs, DVDs) and also to demographic specialization.

The Critical Theory “nightmare” of cultural homogenization is probably unfounded.

Wendy Griswold, American Character and the American Novel (in reader)

She addresses literary theory, in particular the assumption, broadly held, that literature (and cultural products generally) reflect changes in society. So to understand history or modern society, one can learn a lot by studying changes in cultural products like art, literature, and music.

Like DiMaggio’s analysis of the claims of Critical Theory and other cultural critics (conservative and radical), Griswold’s analysis is sociologically realistic and, in a sense, deflating

We can begin by wondering where the novel form came from in the first place, how and why it became so popular.

Popular novels were a product, in part, of the rise of the British middle class in the 18th century, and especially of housewives who could not read Latin and were not interested in poetry, but who were literate in English and wanted entertainment.

18th century was also a time of great interest in the human personality.

Also the rise of booksellers (rather than wealthy patrons) who paid authors by the number of pages.

The result is the novel, which is not too hard to read, devoted to the individual personality and character, and to topics of interest to middle class women.

But nineteenth century American novels are not like this. They are usuallyabou men or boys fleeing society, having adventures in the wilderness far from women (Huckleberry Finn, Moby Dick, Last of the Mohicans, Red Badge of Courage. Why?

Something about the “American character”? Something about the national psyche? Puritan morality?

Wendy Griswold did a sociological study. She took a random sample of American novels published from 1876-1910.

She hypothesized that overall, the content of these novels would not be so different from that of European novels, because European critics tended to focus on what made American novels unique and ignored those that looked a lot like European novels.

Then she wanted to find economic, legal, organizational factors that could explain the uniqueness of American novels. She finds this in copyright law, which allowed legal piracy (copying and selling) of novels by foreign writers until the late 19th century (1891). Publishers made huge profits this way (how could they not?)

Griswold hypothesizes that American novels will be different from European novels until 1891 (because until then they needed to be unique to sell well), but afterward they would become more conventional, concerned with love, marriage, money, morality etc. This is just what she found.

For example, in the earlier period American novels were much more likely than European novels to depict social mobility.

In the earlier period American novels were much more likely to have middle class protagonists, while European novelists had upper class protagonists.

Social reform (prison reform, temperance, treatment of women, cruelty to animals) was more prominent in American novels in the first period, less so in the second period.

American novels were more likely to be set in small towns in the first period.

American novels were more likely to be humorous in the first period.

All of this supports a sociological perspective, in particular a production of culture perspective, on the novel.

Snobs and Cultural Omnivores

Richard Peterson and Roger Kern, "Changing Highbrow Tastes: From Snob to Omnivore"

When we read Bourdieu, we may sense that he’s not entirely right when it comes to the contemporary scene. Do ambitious people really sip wine, go to museums, etc to lift their status and distinguish themselves from others?

Isn’t that all a bit too Parisian, and too old?

Peterson and Kern discuss why this “snob model” is right for certain locations and certain historical periods, such as the late 19th century in the United States.

Anglo-Saxons wanted to distinguish themselves from recent immigrants from Italy, Russia, Ireland, Poland, Greece and so on. They wanted to distinguish their “highbrow” culture from immigrants’ “lowbrow” culture.

Sociologists interested in the arts, media, taste, status, high culture and so forth sometimes refer to Bourdieu’s approach as the “snob model”

But the snob model does not seem to capture the tastes and interests of elites in America today. Highly educated American elites today are likely to be involved in a wide range of low-status activities.

Rich white suburban teenagers listen to rap music. College students listen to world music, Latin music, Afro-Caribbean, rap, popular music.

P&K discuss highbrows, snobs, and omnivores.

Highbrows – like elite culture – classical music and opera

Snobs – highbrows who do not participate in lowbrow (cultures of poor marginal groups, such as blacks, youth, isolated rural people) or middlebrow (commercial, mass cultural) activities

– a perfect snob refuses to engage in any lowbrow or middlebrow activities

these are very rare in the USA – a study in Detroit in the 1960s of 1,400 people did not find one perfect snob

you could probably find a few in New York City, certainly in Paris

Omnivores – enjoy a wide range of lowbrow and middlebrow cultural activities

Remember Bethany Bryson’s article on Musical Dislikes -- patterned tolerance and multicultural capital

P&K find that “omnivorousness is replacing snobbishness”

Omnivores do not like everything, but they are open to appreciating everything

In a way it is opposed to snobbishness, which is based on rigid rules of exclusion

Discriminating omnivorousness replacing snobbishness reflects multiculturalism and relativism in society over ethnocentrism

Omnivores appreciate music differently than other people. They do not identify with it.

Why the shift from snobbishness and to omnivorousness

devaluation of snobbishness because of widespread availability of highbrow culture in the media

rising education levels

geographic migration and social class mobility have mixed people holding different tastes

mass media presents lots of cultural materials to many people

value change from group prejudice, supported by racist social science, to tolerance and diversity

art world change from 19th century European scene, where theorists in the European Royal Academies believed that there were absolute standards of beauty and vulgarity

This consensus was swept away by market forces and aesthetic entrepreneurs in the 20th century (impressionists, Picasso, expressionists, minimalists, postmodernists)

Obviously the value of art was a product of its social circumstances, not of the art itself

generational politics Youth culture has become a viable alternative to “adult” culture

globalization and new elites for whom inclusion and omnivorous is probably a more useful way to create distinction than exclusion and snobbishness

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