Thursday, July 31, 2008

Soc 4260 Cultural Theory Final Exam Review Sheet

Sociology 4260 Cultural Theory (Summer II 2008)

Prof. Gabe Ignatow

Review Sheet for Final Exam (August 6 at 11am in class)

The final exam will cover the following readings:

Pierre Bourdieu, Cultural Power

"Sociology is a Martial Art"

Richard Peterson and Roger Kern, "Changing Highbrow Tastes: From Snob to Omnivore"

Michele Lamont, Symbolic Boundaries and Status

Bethany Bryson, Symbolic Exclusion and Musical Dislikes

Richard Peterson, Why 1955? Explaining the Advent of Rock Music

Paul DiMaggio, Market Structure, the Creative Process, and Popular Culture

Paul DiMaggio, The Role of Cultural Capital in School Success

Mabel Berezin, Cultural Form and Political Meaning

Wendy Griswold, American Character and the American Novel

Emile Durkheim, from The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life

Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith, The Discourse of American Civil Society

You should be able to define and discuss all of the following terms:


Cultural capital

Social capital

Economic capital

Power field

Social space

Symbolic violence

habitus

Kabyle

Symbolic boundaries

Boundary work

Moral boundaries

Cultural boundaries

Socioeconomic boundaries

Cultural specialists

For-profit workers

Musical dislikes

Cultural omnivores

High-status exclusiveness

Educated tolerance

Symbolic racism

Patterned tolerance

Multicultural capital

“tolerance line”

Reception studies

“Watching Dallas

Americanization

Cultural imperialism

Dominant and oppositional readings

Production of culture

Culture industries

Gatekeepers

Sponsors

American character

American novels

European novels

Copyright law

Social facts

Social solidarities

Totemism

Ritual

The sacred and the profane

Collective effervescence

Watergate

American Civil Religion

Democratic code

Counter-democratic code

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Review Sheet for undergraduates taking midterm 1

Sociology 4260 Cultural Theory (Summer II 2008)

Prof. Gabe Ignatow

Review Sheet for Mid-term Exam I. (July 23 at 11am in class)

The 1st mid-term exam will cover the following readings:

William Sewell jr., The Concept(s) of Culture (email)

Philip Smith, Introduction: What is Culture? What is Cultural Theory? (Smith I)

Lynn Spillman, Introduction: Culture and Cultural Sociology (Spillman)

Richard Harvey Brown, Textuality and the Postmodern Turn in Sociological Theory (Smith II)

Philip Smith, 37-57 (Smith I)

Raymond Williams, Base and Superstructure (Spillman)

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” (Spillman)

Habermas, Jurgen, “On Systematically Distorted Communication”

Philip Smith, 13-18 (Smith)

Max Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions” (email)

Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism” (email)

Bryan Turner, Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses (email)

Samuel Huntington, Cultures Count and Lawrence Harrison, Why Culture Matters

Ruth Benedict, “The Diversity of Cultures” (Spillman)

Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture (Spillman)

Richard Shweder, Moral Maps, "First World" Conceits, and the New Evangelists (email)

You should be able to define and discuss all of the following terms:


Karl Marx

George Lukacs

Antonio Gramsci

Horkheimer and Adorno

Jurgen Habermas

Max Weber

Bryan Turner

Ruth Benedict

Clifford Geertz

Richard Shweder

“Prison Notebooks”

The Dialectic of Enlightenment”

“The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”

“The Chrysanthemum and the Sword”

“Patterns of Culture”

Newtonian paradigm

Positivism

Hypothesis testing

Cause-and-effect relationshipgs

“linguistic turn”

“cognitive revolution”

Sociology of culture

Cultural sociology

Culture as “cultivation”

Folk culture

Culture as learned behavior

Culture as creativity/agency

Culture as systems of symbols and meanings

Culture as a life-system, way of life

Culture as meaning

Historical materialism

Communist revolution

False consciousness

“Opium of the people”

Commodification

Commodity Fetishism

Class consciousness

Hegemony

“Organic intellectuals”

Culture industry

“lowest common denominator”

Public sphere

Life-world

System-world

Communicative reason

Colonization of the life-world

Verstehen

Value-rationality

Purposive rationality

Salvation

Theodicy

Calvinism

Bryan Turner

Islamic asceticism

Sufi mystics

“Sultanism”

Individualism

Equality

Trust

Social capital

Synchronic cultural analysis

Diachronic cultural analysis

Cultural functionalism

Culture-as-personality school

Culture as text

Thick description

Thin description


For Cultural Theory undergrads:

We will have a review session during the last hour of class on Monday.

The mid-term exam will be at 11am in class on Wednesday.

I will post a review sheet on the web site, and email it to you, today or tomorrow.

GI

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

Our class has been moved to Wooten Hall 211

See you Wednesday in Wooten 211 at 9:15am

Weber, Neo-Weberians, and Cultural Anthro lecture notes

Max Weber and Religious Values

Max Weber, the early German social thinker, studied everything

Part of his work was his religious sociology, his studies of Calvinism, Islam, ancient Judaism etc.

His aim was Verstehen, sympathetic understanding

Two important ideas of his, for our purposes:

Wertrational – value-rationality

Zweckrational – purposive rationality

Salvation – being saved, living the right kind of life

every religion, and every culture, provides ideas about salvation, about how to live

Theodicy – the question of God’s role in a world of evil, suffering, and injustice

in every religion, intellectuals obsess over the problem of theodicy

different religions solve this tension differently

Culture and Capitalism

The most influential and historically significant book on the interrelations of culture, religion, and capitalism is Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

Weber’s essay is often seen as a response to the growing influence of historical materialism or Marxism in the Germany of his day, with the growth of a large Social Democratic Party.

Historical materialism … Base/Superstructure

persists in varying forms: e.g. environmental or natural resource determinism

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism was published as a two-part study in 1904-5. It not only pointed the way to Weber’s future work but also became the center of a long-running controversy. Distinguished by passionate writing and bold theorization, the argument has attracted attention far outside the boundaries of sociology. Those who invoke the notion of a ‘Protestant work ethic’ may not have read Weber but they are not wrong to echo his belief that the ‘rationalization of labor’ was a decisive feature of modernity.

Weber’s work was prompted by his concern that the German Empire was still socially backward compared with the United States and Britain, and had failed to develop a sufficiently assertive and public spirited bourgeoisie and middle class during the long rule of Bismarck during the 19th century. He believed that the Anglo-Saxon commitment to economic and social freedom was a source of strength and that it was rooted in secularised impulses stemming from the sectarian versions of Protestantism which had been so influential in their history since the seventeenth century.

Weber stressed that contrary to the materialist reductionism of some Marxists, ideas, beliefs, and psychological states could have a large influence on the course of history. Specifically he argued that sectarian Protestantism promoted a ‘worldly asceticism’ and notion of a ‘calling’ or secular vocation which was conducive to the rationalization of labor.

If early twentieth century Germans recognized this they could improve and strengthen the institutions of the German Empire.

While Weber had different political objectives from Marxists, his understanding of the material practices of capitalism owed a lot to Marx. Like Marx he writes of a distinctive ‘rational capitalist organization of (formally) free labor’; the capitalist enterprise calculates wages and prices in order to make a surplus and is defined by this not the simple lust for profit.

Furthermore the opening pages of the Protestant Ethic spell out a whole sequence of material practices seen as crucial to capitalist development in early modern Europe. These include:

1) the rise of autonomous towns

2)the separation of enterprise and

household

3) double entry book-keeping

But Weber does insist that there must have been social-psychological presuppositions for the emergence of capitalist institutions and that in the European case a rationalizing approach to labor had been the unintended consequence of the Reformation

The core of Weber’s argument is that with Luther’s notion of the ‘calling’ the monk’s ideal of an ascetic life became incumbent on all believers. It was taken out of the monasteries and required all to single-mindedly and methodically dedicate themselves to their work, to shun idleness and luxury regardless of their station in life. Protestant teaching, especially that of Calvin, imbued the individual with a sense of original sin; a sober and industrious life would be the sign or proof of salvation.

Theodicy: Calvinism removes God from reality entirely, and “inhuman” idea

In the ‘Protestant Ethic’ Weber argues that the Calvinist belief in predestination furnished a constant inner guarantee of consistent conduct; in a later text on the Protestant sects he urges that each believer takes care to pursue a restrained, godly life because of concern for the opinion of fellow-believers.

There has been much debate over Weber’s specific interpretation of Protestant theology. There is evidence that Calvinism was sometimes associated with collectivism and restraints on merchants, e.g. in New England. But the core of Weber’s argument is that some strands in Protestantism help to give rise to collective psychological conditions that underpinned early capitalist rationalization and accumulation. Weber himself illustrates his case by quotes from Benjamin Franklin, who was a man of affairs rather than a theologian. Weber does not insist that Protestantism is the only route to preparing mentalities that will help to sustain and reproduce capitalist social relations - simply

that in early modern Europe they did play this role. (of course we should think about the development of Asian capitalism as a comparison case or set of cases)

Islam and Capitalism

Bryan Turner Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses

Weber’s treatment of Islam is not nearly as famous as his discussion of Calvinism and capitalism

The usual contrast is between Asian mysticism and Puritan asceticism

Turner argues that Weber was wrong to try to explain the absence of rational capitalism in Islam

instead, the real issue is Islam’s transition from a monetary economy >> agricultural-military regime

Muhammad, after all was a merchant

Weber’s theses on Islam, according to Turner

PE (Protestant Ethic) theses:

1. idealistic theory of values

Calvinist beliefs >> modern capitalism (causal)

2. necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism

no, but Protestant asceticism is necessary for rational capitalism

3. “elective affinity” of ideas and socio-economic contexts

4. Continuity between Marx and Weber: beliefs are shaped by socio-economic contexts

Turner’s analysis of Weber’s analysis of Islam

Meccan Islam was monotheistic and rejected magic

but Islam did not develop into a “salvation religion” because of 1) warrior groups who carried Islam

2) Sufi mystical brotherhoods

individual salvation was reinterpreted through jihad (holy war), suitable for warrior groups on quests for land: Islam becomes a ‘national Arabic warrior religion’

Islamic asceticism became the rigor of the military caste

Sufism provided a salvation path, but it was mystical and other-worldly

together militarism and mysticism produced the “characteristics of a feudal spirit...unquestioned acceptance of slavery, serfdom, and polygamy...simplicity of religious requirements...and ethical requirements”

Islam could thus not lift the Middle East out of feudalism and stagnation, it could not produce capitalism

Islam and Shari’a did not produce a systematic formal law tradition (only fatwa, which are ad hoc judgments)

not because of the content of the early religion, but because of the socio-economic context in which it emerged

Turner argues, however, that Islam was originally urban, commercial, and literate: Mecca

was a trading center

However, Islam provided a culture capable of uniting desert tribesmen (Bedouins) who often attacked caravan routes, with urban merchants. Islam was thus a “triumph of town over desert”

Finally, Weber blames Sultanism for the stagnation of the Middle East, because of the socio-economic conditions it produced

this is because of the “legal insecurity of the taxpaying population” in the presence of foreign troops

the arbitrariness of the tax powers of foreign troops (Selcuks and Mamelukes) could paralyze commerce

towns were merely army camps for patrimonial troops, rather than centers of commerce

patrimonial interference discouraged investments in trade and craft industry, and discouraged a bourgeois lifestyle and bourgeois-commercial utilitarianism, seeing this as sordid greediness


“Neo-Weberians”

Samuel Huntington, Cultures Count and Lawrence Harrison, “Why Culture Matters”

Huntington: author of the “Clash of Civilizations”

Culture changes much more slowly than the economy, technology

Economic and tech’l modernization can occur without modern, liberal, Western cultural values

The contemporary scholars most directly influenced by Weber’s book insist that culture, usually national cultures, i.e. “culture as system,” continues to affect the economic growth of modern nations.

To get their point, imagine, if you will, that we are living in the 1950s or early 1960s. Countries across the world are becoming independent, that is they’re rejecting colonialism. Optimism abounded, and serious scholars believed that economic growth would be more or less uniform in most developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

N. Africa was predicted by many to grow most quickly, because of its proximity to Europe and its pool of cheap labor.

JFK and other American leaders were openly concerned about Brazil’s economic development, its ability to compete with the US

50 years later, what happened?

There have been some notable economic successes: Germany and Japan rebuilt their shattered economies into world powers, and Spain, Portugal, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong have entered the “first world,” more or less. But what about the rest of the world, especially Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East?

For the most part, low economic growth and its social correlates:

severe economic stratification

Illiteracy, especially among women

Poverty

High birth rates, population growth rates

Corruption is near-universal

Why? Some explanations:

Colonialism had deleterious effects of all sorts, e.g. drawing arbitrary borders around “nations” (as in Africa)

“Neo-colonialism” Post-colonial theory

continuing dependency: countries on the global economic periphery, e.g. Latin American countries, are beholden to core countries such as the U.S., and provide us with raw materials only

Systemic Racism: economic development disproportionately benefits white men; the global economic system is inherently racist and oppressive to minorities and women

These explanations are unsatisfying to lots of people, certainly to H&H. So Neo-Weberians look to cultural values, including

  1. equality
  2. civility
  3. individualism
  4. time orientation
  5. religious outlook
  6. optimism versus pessimism
  7. “trust” and social capital
  8. “rationality”

Later in their book, Harrison and Huntington explore the idea that cultures should be reprogrammed and modernized, that this would be better than simply giving financial aid to poor countries. And they find support among generally western-educated scholars and NGO workers from Africa, Asia and elsewhere.


Cultural Anthropology

Like Weber (at times), cultural anthropologist view culture as a system.

Their analyze “cultures” in synchronic, not diachronic, terms. This is part of what makes cultural anthropology unique.

Their approach and methods are interpretive; they see cultures as texts that are open to interpretation, and contain recurring themes and symbolism

Cultural anthropology can tend to be functionalist in its thinking.

Everything in a culture serves a function

Everything in a culture is part of an integrated whole

Society is a system of mutual interdependence that must be kept in equilibrium

Cultures are necessary for human life, serve concrete needs:

For rearing and socializing children

For creating social solidarity and harmony

An implication of these functionalist views is that indigenous cultures should be protected or preserved

i.e. if Westerners tamper with one part of an indigenous culture, they may destroy the whole thing

This view was crucial for anthropology during its early years in the 20th century, when Western powers still operated systems of colonial control in “3rd world” countries.

Ruth Benedict, “The Diversity of Cultures” (Spillman)

From her undergraduate work, she had a background in literature, and in the various ways of studying a text to grasp its various levels of meaning.

She did not concern herself as much with history as did her peers. Rather, she was looking for repeated themes, for the importance given various values and beliefs, and for how all of this fit together (or didn’t).

Benedict's Patterns of Culture (1934) was translated into fourteen languages and was published in many editions as standard reading for anthropology courses in American universities for years.

Culture-and-personality:

The essential idea in Patterns of Culture is “her view of human cultures as “personality writ large.’”

Each culture, Benedict explains, chooses from "the great arc of human potentialities" only a few characteristics which become the leading personality traits of the persons living in that culture. These traits comprise an interdependent constellation of aesthetics and values in each culture which together add up to a unique gestalt. For example she described the emphasis on restraint in Pueblo cultures of the American southwest, and the emphasis on abandon in the Native American cultures of the Great Plains. She used the Nietzschean opposites of "Apollonian" and "Dionysian" as the stimulus for her thought about these Native American cultures. She describes how in ancient Greece, the worshipers of Apollo emphasized order and calm in their celebrations. In contrast, the worshipers of Dionysus, the god of wine, emphasized wildness, abandon, letting go. And so it was among Native Americans. She described in detail the contrasts between rituals, beliefs, personal preferences amongst people of diverse cultures to show how each culture had a "personality" that was encouraged in each individual.

Other anthropologists of the culture and personality school also developed these ideas—notably Margaret Mead in her Coming of Age in Samoa (published before "Patterns of Culture") and Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (published just after Benedict's book came out).

“modal personality”—cluster of traits most common to a traditional culture/social group

In Patterns of Culture she expresses her belief in cultural relativism. She desired to show that each culture has its own moral imperatives that can be understood only if one studies that culture as a whole.

Morality, she argued, was relative to the values of the culture in which one operated.

Critics have objected to the degree of abstraction and generalization inherent in the “culture and personality” approach.

The Chrysanthemum and the Sword

This book is an instance of Anthropology at a Distance. Study of a culture through its literature, through newspaper clippings, through films and recordings, etc., was necessary when anthropologists aided the United States and its allies in World War II. Unable to visit Nazi Germany or Japan under Hirohito, anthropologists made use of the cultural materials produced studies at a distance. They were attempting to understand the cultural patterns that might be driving their aggression, and hoped to find possible weaknesses, or means of persuasion that had been missed.

Benedict's war work included a major study, largely completed in 1944, aimed at understanding Japanese culture. Americans found themselves unable to comprehend matters in Japanese culture. For instance, Americans considered it quite natural for American prisoner of wars to want their families to know they were alive, and to keep quiet when asked for information about troop movements, etc., while Japanese POWs, apparently, gave information freely and did not try to contact their families.

In more recent years however, Benedict's "national character" approach has been criticized as being subjective, and at times even demeaning -- she characterized Dobu people, for example, as mean-spirited and paranoid.

Anthropologists were now eager to get away from imposing their own culturally created value judgments on other societies. And Benedict appeared to have gotten caught up the mentality of her era, a mentality that wanted to see people of different nationalities in stereotyped ways. Additionally, her approach has always been criticized for not putting greater emphasis on class differences.

Clifford Geertz

Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture (Spillman)

In the 1970s, Geertz becomes the public “ambassador” of anthropology, much as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead had been before him. However, while Benedict was read by the educated public, Geertz is read mostly by graduate students and academics.

Like Benedict, Geertz conceptualizes culture as a text that can be read and interpreted in terms of recurring themes and symbolism. This is in stark contrast to Marxist and neo-Marxist (materialist) approaches.

Like Neo-Weberians, Geertz takes on the mantle of Max Weber. Geertz is one of the most famous and influential anthropologists ever, and as we will see, Richard Shweder, another anthropologist and a critic of the neo-Weberians Huntington and Harrison, takes on the mantle of Geertz.

Geertz’s famous phrase, quoting Weber: “Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs…”

The analysis of culture is therefore not an experimental science in search of law, but an interpretive one in search of meaning.

Studying culture for Geertz thus involves doing ethnography, living with people in their communities, interviewing them, taking notes, and doing “thick description”

Thick description involves thinking about culture, that is thinking about what things mean in a social setting

Thin description, by contrast, involves simple physical description of what is happening

Interpretive understanding is as important as causal understanding

Geertz’s most famous study is of cockfighting on the Indonesian island of Bali

He argues that the system of betting reflects the status hierarchy and macho culture of the Balinese men.

The cultural practice of cockfighting “reflects” deeper truths about Balinese society.

Balinese men wager irrationally high stakes because of the social meaning of the cockfight and its outcome. People don’t remember the money they won or lost, so much as the status order of the winners and losers.

The culture of a people is an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong”

Richard Shweder, Moral Maps, "First World" Conceits, and the New Evangelists

Shweder writes in the tradition of Clifford Geertz, and so also of Max Weber, but his position is quite different from that of the neo-Weberians we discussed above.

He is, to put it bluntly, a strong relativist and he refutes notions of cultural superiority, certainly of western cultural superiority, or as he puts it the culture of northwestern Europe.

Nonwestern cultures are not something to be denigrated or reprogrammed, rather westerners have much to learn from nonwestern cultures and societies.

Harrison and Huntington are wrong because theories of “national culture” have long been discredited, because different cultures place different relative importance on different values, and because people from nonwestern societies who want to change their own cultures’ values do not reflect their own cultures, but rather certain western values.

We can all learn from all different kinds of cultures, from experiencing life in different cultures, so we ought to respect and preserve different cultures, which have lasted for thousands of years.

For example, Shweder applauds the rejection of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights by the American Anthropological Association in the 1940s. They argued that it was an ethnocentric document.

Saturday, July 12, 2008

On-line version of Weber's "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism"

http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/weber/world/sect/sect_frame.html

Monday, July 7, 2008

Youtube video about the Frankfurt School

Don't feel you have to watch this. It might be interesting to some of you.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=5ULLZm_x_YE

Habermas reading

Dear students,

I have posted below the best Habermas article I was able to find. If you want more or better Habermas, try:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas
http://youtube.com/watch?v=jBl6ALNh18Q


Jurgen Habermas "The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld"


The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld
Jiirgen Habermas



The provisional concept of society proposed here is radically different in one respectfromthe Parsonianconcept:thematureParsons rein terpretedthestruc¬tural components of the lifcworld -culture, society, perso nality -as action systems constituting environments for one another. Without much ado, he subsumed the concept of the lifeworld gained from an action-theoretical perspective under systems -theoretical concepts. As we shall see below, the structuralcomponentsofthe lifeworldbecomesubsystems of ageneralsystem of action, to 'which the physical substratum of the lifeworld is reckoned along with the "behavior system." The p roposal That I am advancing here, by contrast, attempts to take into account the methodological differences between the internalist and the externalist viewpoints connected with the two conceptual strategies .
From the participant p erspective of members of a Iifeworld it looks as if sociologywith asystems-theoreticalorientationconsidersonly oneofthethree components of the lifeworld, namely, the institutional system, for which cultureand personality merelyconstitute complementaryenvironments. from the observer perspective of systems theory, on the other h and, it looks as if life¬world analysis confines itself to one societal subsystem specialized in maintaining structural patterns (pattern maintenance); in this view, the com ¬ponents of the lifeworld are merely internal differentiations of this subsystem which specifies the parameters of societal self-maintenance. It is already evident on methodological grounds that a systems theory of society cannot be self-sufficient. The structures of the iifeworld. with their own inner logic placing internal constraints on system maintenance, have to be gotten at by a hermeneutic approach that picks up on members' pretheoretical knowledge. Furthermore, the objective conditions under which the systems-theoretical objectification of the lifeworJd becomes necessary have themselves only arisen in the course ofsocial evolution. ndthiscallsforatypeofexplanation that docs not already move within the system perspective.

I understand social evolution as a second-order process of differentiation: system and lifcworld aredifferentiatedin the sensethatthe complexity ofthe one and the rationality of the other grow. But it is not only qua system and Lilla lifeworld that they are differ entiated; they get differentiated from one another atthe sametime.Ithasbecomeconventionalforsociologiststodistinguish the stages of social evolution as tribal societies, traditional societies, or societies organized around a state, and modern societies (where the econorn ic system has been differentiated out). From the system perspective, these stages are marked by the appearance of new systemic mechanisms and corresponding levels of complexity. On this plane of analysis, the uncoupling of system and lifew orld is depicted in such a way that the lifeworld, which is at first co¬extens ivewithascarcelydifferentiatedsocialsystem,getscut down moreand
tr~ moretoonesubsystemamong others.In tile process,systemmechanismsget
~' . ~:. ' further and further detached from the social structures through which social
integration takes place. As we shall see, mod ern societies attain a level of
[l,
system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are connectedwithoneanotherviadeJin guistifi edmediaofcornmunication: these systemicmechanisms-forexample,money-steerasocial intercoursethat has been largely disconnected from norms and values, above all in those sub¬systems of purposive rational economic and administrative action that, on Weber's dia gnosis, have become indep endent of their moral-political foun¬dations.
At the same time, the lifeworld remains the subsystem that defines the pattern ofthesocialsystemasawhole.Thus, systemicmechanismsneed tobe anchoredin the lifeworld:theyhavetobeinstitutionalized.Thisinstitutional¬i izationofnewlevelsofsystemdifferentiation canalsobe perceived from the I internal perspective of the life-world. Whereas system differentiation in tribal societies only leads to the increasing complexity of pregiven kinship systems, at higher levels of integration new social structures take shape, namely, the stateand media-steered subsystems.Insocietieswithalow degree of differentiation, systemic interconnections are tightly interwoven with mechanisms of social integration; in modern societies they are consolidated and objectifi ed into norm-free structures. Members behave toward formally organized action systems, steered via processes of exchange and power, as toward a block of quasi-natural reality; within these media-steered subsystems society congeals intoasecond nature.Actors have alwaysbeen able to sheeroff from an orien¬tation to mutual understanding, adopt a strategic attitude, and objectify normative contexts into something in the objective world, but in modern societies, economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge in which social relations are regulated only via money and power. Norrn-conforrnative attitudes and identity-forming social memberships are neither necessary nor possible in these spheres; theyare madeperipheralinstead.[. ..]
, In subsystems differentiated out via steering media, systemic mechanisms create their own, norm-free social structures jutting out from the lifeworld. These structures do, of course, re main linked with everyday communicative
practice via basic institutions of civil or public law. We cannot directly infer
from the mere fact that system and social integration have been largely un ¬coupled to linear depe ndency in one direction or the other. Both are
conceivable:the institutions thatanchorsteering mechanismssuchas power and money in the lifeworld could serve as channels either for the influence of the lifcworld on formally organized d omains of action or, conversely, for the
influence of the system on communicatively stru ctured contexts of action. In
the one case, they function as an institutional framework that subjects system maintenance to the nonnative restrictions of the lifeworld, in the other, as a
base that subordinates the life-world to the systemic constraints of material
reproduction and thereby "mediatizes" it.
Ln theoriesofthestateand ofsociety,bothmodelshavebeenplayedth rough. Modern natural law theories neglected the inner logic of a functionally
stabilized civil society in relati on to the state; the classics of political economy were concerned Io show that systemic imperatives were fundamentally in harmony with the basic norms of a polity guaranteeing freedom and justice. Marx destroyed this practically very important illusion; he showed that the
,
lawsofcapitalistcommodity production havethelatentfunctionofsustaini ng a structure that makes a mockery of bourgeois ideals. The lifeworld of the capitalist carrier strata, which was expounded in rational natural law and in the ideals of bourgeois th ought generally, was devalued by Marx to a socio¬cultural superstructure. In his picture of base and superstructure he is also raising the methodological dema nd that we excha nge the internal perspective of the lifeworld for an observer's perspective, so that we might grasp
the systemic imperatives of an independent economy as they act upon the
bourgeois lifeworld a iergo. Inhisview, onlyinasocialistsocietycouldthespell castupon the lifeworld by the systembebroken,could thedependenceofthe
superstructureon the base be lifted.
In one way, the most recent systems functionalism is an heir-successor to
Marxism, which it radicalizes and defuses at the same time. On the one hand, systems theory adopts the view that the systemic constraints of material production, which it understands as imperatives of self-maintenance of the generalsocialsystem,reachrightthr ough thesymbolicstructuresofthelife¬world. On the other hand, it removes the critical sting from the base-superstructure thesis by reinterpreting what was int ended to be an em¬pirical diagnosis as a prior analytical distinction. Marx took over from
bourgeoissocialtheorya presupposition thatwefoundagaininDur kheim:it isnota molterof indifference toasocietywhetherand towhatextentformsof
social integration dependent on consensus are repressed and replaced by anonymousformsofsystem integrativesociation.Atheoreticalapproachthat
presents the lifeworld merely as one of several anonymously steered sub¬systems undercuts this distinction. Systems theory treats accomplishments of
social and system integration as functionally equivalent and thus deprives
itselfof thestandard ofcommunicativerationality. Andwithout thatstandard, increases in complexity achieved at the expense of a rationalized lifeworld cannot be id entified as costs. Systems theory lacks the analytic means to pursue the question that Marx(also) built intohisbase-superstructure metaphor and Weber renewed inhisown wayby inquiringintotheparadoxofsocietalration ¬alization. Forus,this question takesontheformofwhetherthe rationalization
of the Iifeworld does not become paradoxical with the transition to mod ern societies. The rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible the emergence andgrowthofsubsystems whoseindependentimperatives turn backdestruc¬
tively upon the lifcworld itself. Ishall nov; take a closer look at the conceptual means by which this hypoth¬esis might be given a more exact formulation. The assu mption regarding a
"rnediatization" of the lifeworld refers to "interference" phenomena that arise when system and lifeworld have become differentiated from one another to such an extent that they can exert mutual influence upon one an other. The mediatizationofthelifeworldtakeseffecton andwiththe structuresofthelife¬
I
world; it is not one of those processes that arc available as themes within the
lifeworld, and thus it cannot be read off from the intuitive knowledge of members. Ontheother hand,itisalso inaccessiblefrom anexternal,systems¬
~
theoreticalperspective. Althoughitcomesabout countcrintuitivclvandcannot easily be perceived from the internal perspective of the lifeworld, there arc in¬dications of it in the formal conditions of communicative action.
The uncoupling of system integration and social integration means at first only a differentiation between two types of action coordination, one coming about through the consensus of those involved, the other through functional
;
interconnectionsofaction.System-integrativemechani smsattach totheeffects of action. As they work through action orientations in a subjectively in¬conspicuousfashion,theymayleavethe socially integrativecontexts ofaction which they are parasitically utilizing structurally unaltered -it is this sort of intenneshing of system with social integration that we postulated for the de ¬velopment level of tribal societies. Things are different when sys tem integration intervenesin the veryforms ofsocial integration.In thiscase,too, wehavetodowithlatentfunctional interconnections,but thesubjectiveincon¬spicuousness of systemic constraints that instrumenialize a communicatively structured lifeworld takes on the character of deception, of objectively false
I••• •
consciousness. The effects of the system on the lifeworld, which change the structure of contexts of action in socially integrated groups, have to remain hidden.Therep roductiveconstraintsthatinstrumentalizealifeworld without
~
r:
weakening the illusion of its self-sufficiency have to hide, so to speak, in the pores of communicative action. This gives rise to a structural violence that, withoutbecomingmanifest assuch, takesholdofthe formsofintersubjectivity ofpossible understanding. Structuralviolence isexercisedbywayofsystemic restrictionsoncommunication;distortionisanchoredin theformalconditions of communicative action in such a way that the interrelation of the objective, social, and subjective worlds gets prejudged for participants in a typical
t.
The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld 175
'.' ,:~
fashion. ln analogy to the cognitive a priori of Lukacs' "forms of objectivity," I shall introduce the concept of eform of understanding [Verstiindigungsform].
:~
Lukacs defined forms of objectivity as principles that, through the societal totality, preform the encounters of individuals with objective nature, norma¬tive reality, and their own subjective nature. He speaks of a priori forms of
objectivity because, operating within the framework of the philosophy of the
subject, he starts from the basic relation of a knowing and acting subject to thedomainof perceptibleandmanipulableobjects.After the changeof para¬
digm introduced by the theory of communication, the formal properties of the intersubjectivityofpossibleunderstandingcan taketheplaceoftheconditions of the objectivity of possible experience. A form of mutual understanding
represents a compromise between the general structures of communicative action and reproductive constraints unavailable as themes within a given life¬
t" "•
world. Historically variable forms of understanding are, as it were, the sectionalplanesthatresultwhensystemic constraintsofmateria1reproduction
t
inconspicuously intervene in the forms of social integration and thereby
t
,
med iatize the lifew orld. frshall now (a) illu strate the concept of a form of understanding with those
i,
F civilizations in which religious-metaphysical worldviews take on ideological functions, in order (b) to gain an analytic perspective on the hyp othetical sequence offormsof mutual understanding.
(a) In societies organized around a state, a need for legitimation arises that, forstr ucturalreasons, couldnotyetexistin tribalsocieties.Insocietiesorgan ¬ized throughkinship,theinst itutionalsystemisanchoredritually,thatis,ina practice that is interpreted by mythical narratives and that stabilizes its norma¬tivevalidity allbyitself. Bycontrast,theauthorityof thelawsin which ageneral political or der is articulated has to be guaranteed, in the first instance, by the ruler 's p ower of sanction. Bllt political d omination has socially integrating poweronly insofaras dispositionovermeansofsanction doesnotrest onnaked
"
repression, but on the authority of an office anc hored in turn in a legal order. For this reason, laws need to be intersubjectively recognized by citizens; they
have to be legitimated as right and proper. This leaves culture with the task of supplying reasons why an existing political order deserves to be recognized. Whereas mythicaln arrativesinterpretandmakecompre hensiblearitualprac¬
ticeofwhich theythemselvesarep art,religiousand metaphysical worldvi cws ofpropheticoriginhavethe form ofdoctrinesthatcan be worked upintellec¬tually and that explain and justify an existing political order in terms of the world-order they explicate.'
The need for legitimation that arises, for structural reasons, in civilizations is especially precarious. If one compares the ancient civilizations with even strongly hierarchized tribal societies, one finds an unmistakable increase in social inequality. In the framework of state organization, units with different structures can be functionally specified. Once the organization of social Jabor is uncoupled from kinship relations, resources can be more easily mobilized
and moreeffectivelycombined.Butthisexpansionofmaterialreproductionis
176 JOrgen Habermas
~
i.
gained at the price of transforming the stratified kinship system into a strati¬
f
fied class society. What presentsitsclf from a system perspective as nil integrationofsocietyatthelevelofanexpanded materialreproduction,means, from the perspective of social integration, an increase in social inequality,
wholesale economic exploitation, and the juridically cloaked repression of I dependent classes.Thehistoryofpenal law provides unmistakableindicators of the high degree of repression req uired in all ancient civilizations. Social movements that can be analyzed as class struggles -although they were not tcarriedonassuch-poseathreattosocialintegration.Forthisreason,thefunc¬tionsofexploitationandrepressionfulfilledbyrulersand rulingclassesinthe systemic nexus of m aterial reproduction have to be kept latent as far as
t-

possible. Vvorldviewshavetobecomeideologica J1y efficacious. r•..J I
f
t
Atfirst glance,itstrikes oneas puzzling thatideological interpretationsof the
II.
world and society could be sus tained against allappearances of barb aricinjustice.
f•
The constraints of material reproduction could not have reached so effectively and relentlessly throughtheclass-specificlifeworldsofcivilizations if cultural traditions had not been immunized against disson ant experiences. J would explain this unassailability by the systemic restrictions placed on communi¬cation. Altho ugh religious-metaphysical worldviews exerted a strong attraction on intellectual strata; although they provoked the hermeneutic efforts of many generations of teachers, theologians, educated persons, preachers, m andarins, bureaucrats, citizens, and the like; although they were reshaped byargumentation,givenadogmaticform,systematizedand ration¬
I
alized in terms of their own motifs, the basic religious and metaphysical
I•
I
conceptslayatalevelof undifferentiated validityclaimswhere therationality potentialofspeechremains moretightly boundthanin theprofanepracticeof everydaylife,whichhadnot beenworked throughintellectually.Owingtothe fusionof antic,normative, and expressiveaspectsofvalidity,and to the culti¬callyrooted fixationofacorrespondingbeliefattitude,thebasic conceptsthat carried, as it were, the legi timation load of ideologicalJy effective worldviews were imm unized against objections already within the cognitive reach of everyday communication. The im munization could succeed when an institu¬tional se paration be tween the sacred and the profane realms of action ensured thattraditionalfoundations werenottakenup "in thewrong place";within the domainoftilesacred, communication remained systenzatically restricted due to the lack of differentiation between spheres of va lidity, that is, as a result of the [orma! conditions ~fpQssi1J le understanding?
The mode of legitimation in civilizations is thus based on a form of under ¬standing that systemically limits possibilities of com munication owing to its failure to differentiate sufficiently among the various validity claims. Earlier
i.
I
weplaced mythical,religious-metaphysical,andmodern worldviewsinahier¬archy, according to the degree of deccntration of the world-understandings they make possible. Analogously, we can order action orientations, and the realms of action they define, accord ing to the degree of differentiation of
I.

The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld
validityaspects,andin this waywe can getattherelative apriorioftheform ofunderstanding d ominantat agiven time and place.These forms of the inter¬511bjecti'uity of mutual understanding do not reflect the structures of dominant worldviews in any symmetrical m anner, for established interpretive systems do notpervade allareasofactionwith the sameintensity.Aswe haveseen,in civilizations the immunizing power ofthe form of understandingderives from a peculiar, structurally describable differential between two realms of action: in comparison to profane action orientations, sacred ones enjoy a greater authority,even th oughvalidityspheresarelessdifferentiated andthepoten¬tialforrationalityislessdeveloped insacred thanin profanedomains ofaction.
(b) With asystematic investigation offormsof understan ding in mind,Tshall distinguish four domains of action: (1) the domain of cuItic practice; (2) the domaininwhichreligioussystems ofinterpretation have the powerdirectlyto orienteveryday practice;andfinallytheprofanedomainsinwhichthecultural shock of knowledge is utilized for (3) communication and (4) purposive activity, without thestructures ofthe worldview directlytakingeffect in action orienta tions.
Since I regard (1) and (2) as belonging to the sacred realm of action, I can avoid difficulties that result from Durkheims oversimplified division.
Magical practicescarried onbyindividuals outsideoftheculticcommunity should not be demoted, as Durkheim proposed they sho uld, to the profane realm.Everyday practiceisp ermeated througboutwith ceremonies thatcannot be understood in utilitarian terms. It is better not to limit the sacred realm of action toculticpractice,buttoextend itto theclassofactions based on religious patterns ofinterpretation.'
Furthermore, there are internaI relations between the structures of world¬views and the kinds ofculticactions:to myth therecorresponds a ritual practice (and sacrificial actions) of tribal members; to religious-metaphysical world¬views a sacramental practice (and p rayers) of the congregation; to the religion of culture [B ildullssrcligicm] oftheearly modernperiod,finally,a contemplative presentationofauraticworks ofart.Along thispath,cultic practicegets"dis¬enchanted," in Weber's sense; it loses the character of compelling the gods to some end, and it is less and less carried on in the consciousness that a divine power can be forced to do something."
Within the realm of profane action r shall di stinguish between communi¬cative and purposive activity; J shall assume that these two aspects can be distinguished even when corresponding types ofaction (not to mention domains
ofaction defined by thesetypes)havenot yetbeen differentiated.Thedistinc¬tion between communicative and purposive activity is not relevant to the sacred realm. In my view, there is no point in contrasting religious cults and magical practices from this perspective."
The next step would be to place the practices in different domains of action in a developmental-logical order according to the degree to which aspects of validity have been differentiated from one another. At one end of the scale stands ritual practice, at the other end the practice of argumentation. If we
178 JOrgen Habermas
further consider that be tween the sacred and the profane domains there are
differentials in authority and rationality -and in the opposite directions ¬
we then have the p oints of view relevant to ordering the forms of under¬
standing in a systematic sequence. The following schema (figure 12.1)
represents four forms of mutual understanding ordered along the line of a
progressive unfettering of the rationality potentia]in herentin communicative
action. The areas (1-2) and (3-4) stand for the form of understanding in archaic
societies,theareas(5-6)and(7-8) for thatincivilizations,the areas(9-10)and (11-12) for that in early modern societies.
Takingthearchaicformof understandingasan exa mple,Ishallnext givea somewhatmoredetailedaccountofthe contrastingdirectionsofthedifferen¬tials in authority and rationality between the sacred and the profane domains
r:;
of action. Following that 1 shall comment more briefly on the forms of under¬
L
standing typicalofcivilizations (5-8) andofearly modern societies(9-12).
(ad 1 and2)Wefind ritualizedbehavioralreadyinvertebratesocieties;in the transitional field between primate hordes and paleolithic societies, social in¬tegration was probably routed primarily th rough those strongly ritualized modes of behavior we counted above as symbolically mediated interaction. Only with the transformation of primitive systems of calls into grammaticalJy regulated,propositionally differentiated speech wasthesocioculturalstarting point reached at which ritualized behavior changed into ritualized action; language opened up, so to speak, an interior view of rites. From this point on, we no longer have to be content with describing ritualized behavior in terms of
!
r .:
its observable features and hyp othesized functions; 1\Te can try to understand
(:
rituals-insofarasthev havemaintain edaresidualexistenceandhavebecome
-'
known to us thr ough field studies.
A modern obse rver is struck by the extremely irrational character of ritual practices. The aspects of action that we cannot help but keep apart today are merged inone andthesameact.Theelementofpu rposiveactivitycomesou.t in the fact that ritual practices are supposed magically to bring about states in the world; the element of normatively regulated action is noticeable in the
~~ ,
qualityofobligationthatemanatesfromthe rituallyconjured,atonceattracting
'";:
and terrifying, powers; the element of expressive action is especially clear in the standardized expressions of feeling in ritual ceremonies; finally an asser¬toric aspect is also present inasmuch as ritual practice serves to represent and reproduce exemplary events or mythically narrated original scenes.
Ritual practice is, of course, already part of a sociocultural form of life in 'which ahigherformofcomm unicationhasemerged with grammaticalspeech. Language (in the strict sense) breaks up the unity of teleological, normative, expressive,andcognitiveaspectsofaction.Yetm ythical thou ghtshields ritual practice from the tendencies toward decomposition that appear at the level of language (with the differentiation between action oriented to mutual understanding and to success, and the transformation of adaptive behavior intopurposiveactivity).Mythholdsthesa measpectstogether on theplane of

interpretation that are fused together in ritual on the plane of practice. An in ¬terpretation of the world that confuses internal relations of meaning with external relations among things, validity with empirical efficacy, can protect ritual practice against rips in the fabric woven from communicative and pur¬posive activity indistingui.shably. This expl ains its coexistence with profane contexts of cooperation in w hich goal-oriented actions arc effectively co¬ordinated within the framework of kinship roles. The experience gained in everyday practice is worked up in myth and connected with narrative ex¬planationsoftheordersofthe worldandofsociety.in thisregard,mythbridges over the two domains of action.
We can see in the formal structures of the relevant action orientations that there is a rationality differential between sacred and profane domains. At the heart of the sacred realm is ritual practice, which stands or falls with the inter¬weaving of purposive activity and communication, of orientations to success with orientations to mutual understanding. It is stabilized by a my thicaI und er¬standing of the world that, while it develops in narrative form, that is, at the levelof grammaticalspeech, nonethelessexhibi tssimilar categoricalstructures. In the basic categories of m yth, relations on validity are still confused with relationsofeffectiveness.On theotherhand,themythicalworldviewisopened to the flow of experience from the realm of profane action. Everyday practice already rests on a difference betw een aspects of validity and reality.
(ad 3 and 4) ft is above all in the areas of production and warfare that co¬operation based on a division of labor develops and requires action oriented to success.From thestandpointofdevelopmentalhistoryaswell,efficacyisthe earliest aspect of the rationality of action. As long as truth claims could barely be isolated on the level of communicative action, the "know-how" invested in technical and strategic rulescould notyettaketheformofexplicitknowledge. In contrast to magic, the profane practice of everyday life already calls for differentiatingbetweenorientationstosuccessand to mutualunderstanding. However,within communicative action theclaims to truth,to truthfulness,and to rightness likely flow ed together in a whole that was first broken up in a methodicalfashion when, with theadv entofwriting,astratumofliteratiarose who learned to produce and process texts.
The normative scope of communicative action was relatively narrowly restricted by particularistic kins hip relations. Un der the aspect of fulfilling standardized tasks, goal-directed coopera tive actions rem ained embedded in a communicative practice that itself served to fulfill narrowly circumscribed social expectations.Theseexpectationsissued from asocialstructureregarded as part of a mythically explained and ritually secured world-o rder.The mythi ¬cal system of interpretation closed the circuit between profane and sacred domain s.
(ad 5 and 6) When a holistic concept of validity was constituted, internal relations of meani ng could be differentiated from external relations among

The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld
things, though it was still not possible to discriminate among the various aspects of validity. As Weber has shown, it is at this stage that religious and met aphysical worldviews arise. Their basic concepts proved to be resistant to l:'veryattemptto separateofftheaspectsofthe truc,thegood,and theperfect. Corresponding to such worldviews is a sacramental practice with forms of prayer or exercises and with demagicalized communication between the in¬dividual believer and the divine being. These worldviews are more or less dich otomousinstructure; theyset upa"worldbeyond"andleaveadem ythol¬ogized "this world " or a desocialized "world of appear ances" to a disenchanted everyday practice.Intherealm of profane action, structures take shape thatbreakup theholisticconceptofvalidity.
(ad 7 and 8) On the level of communicative action, the syn drome of validity claims breaks up. Particip ants no longer only differentiate between orien ¬tations tosuccessand tomutual understanding, butbetweenthedifferentbasic pragmaticattitudes aswell.A politywithastate andconventionallegalinsti¬tutions has to rely on obedience to the law, that is, on a norm-conforming attitude towardlegitimateorder.Thecitizensofthestate mustbeabletodis¬tinguish this attitude -in everyday actions as well -from an objectivating attitude toward externalnatureandanexpressive attitude vis-a-vis their own inner nature. At this stage, communicative action can free itself from particu¬laristiccontexts,butitstays inthespacemarked outbysolid traditionalnorms. An argu mentative treatm ent of texts also makes participants aware of the differencesbetween communicativeaction and discourse.Butspecificvalidity claims aredifferentiatedonlyontheplaneofaction.Thereare notyetformsof argumentation tailored to specific aspects of validity."
Purposiveactivityalso attainsahigherlevelof rationality.When truthclaims can be isolated, it becomes possible to see the int ernal connection between the efficiencyofactionoriented tosuccessandthe truthofempiricalstatements, and to make sure of technical know-how. Thus practical professional knowl¬edge can assume objective shape and be tran smitted through teaching. Purposive activity gets detached from unspecific age and sex roles. To the extentthatsociallabor is organized vialegitimate power,specialactivitiescan define occupational roles.
(ad 9 and 10) That validity claims are not yet fully differentiated at this stage can be seen in the ell lturaltradition oftheearlymodern period. Independent cultural value spheres do take shape, but to begin with only science is insti¬tutionalized inanunambigu ousfashion,thatis, undertheaspectofexactlyone validityclaim.Anautonomousartretainsitsauraand theenjoymentofartits contemplative character;both featuresderive from itsculticorigins. Anethics of conviction remains tied to the context of relig ious traditions, however subjectivized: postconventional legal representations are still coupled with truthclaimsin rationalnaturallaw andform thenucleusof what RobertBellah has called "civil religion. " Thus, although art, morality and law are already
182 Jurqen Habermas
differentiated value spheres, they do not get wholly disengaged from the sacred domain so long as the int ernal development of each does not proceed unambiguously under preciselyonespecificaspectofvalidity.On the other hand, the forms of modern religiosity give up basic d ogmatic claims. They destroy the metaphysical-religious "world beyond" and no longer dichotomouslycontrastthis profaneworld to Transcendence,or the worldof appearances to the reality of an underlying Esscncc. In domains of profane action,structurescan takeshape thatare defined byan unrestricteddifferenti¬ationofvalidityclaimson thelevelsofaction and a rgumen ta tion.
(ad 11and 12)It ishere thatdi scoursebecomes relevantfor profanespheresof action,too.In everyday communication,participants can keepap artnot only differ entbasicp ragmaticattitudes,butalso thelevelsofactionanddiscourse. Domains of action normcd by positive law with post-traditional legal insti¬tutions, presuppose that participants are in a position to shift from naively performing actions to reflectively engaging in argumentation. To the extent that the hypothetical discussion of normative validity claims is institutional¬ized, the critical potential of speech can be brou ght to bear on existing institutions.Legitimateordersstillappear tocommunicativelyacting subjects as somethingnormative, but thisnormativity hasa different quality insofar as institutions are no longer legitimated per se through religious and meta¬physical w orJdv iews.
Purposive activity is freed from normative contexts in a more radicalized sense. Up to this point, action oriented to success remained linked with norms of action and em bedded in communicative action within the framework of a task-oriented system of social cooperation. But with the legal institutional¬ization of the monetary medium, success-oriented action steered by egocentric calculations of utility loses its connection to action oriented by mutual under¬standing. This strategic action, which is disengaged from the mechanism of reaching understanding and calls for an objectivating attitude even in regard tointerpersonalrelations,is promoted tothemodelformethodicallydealing withascientificallyobjectivatednature.In theinstr umentalsphere,pur posive activitygetsfree ofnormativerestrictionstotheextentthatitbecomeslinked toflowsofinformationfrom thescientific system.
Thetwoareasontheleftinthebottomrow offigure12.1havebeen leftempty because, with the development of mod ern societies, the sacred domain has largelydisintegrated, oratleasthaslostitsstructure-formingsignificance.At thelevelofcompletelydifferentiatedvalidityspheres.artsheds itsculticback¬ground, just as morality and law detach themselves from their religions and metaphysical background. With this secularization of bourgeois culture, the cultural value sp heres separate off sharply from one another and de velop according to the standards of the inner logics specific to the different validity claims.Culturelosesjustthoseformalpropertiesthatenabled it totakeonideo¬logical functions. Insofar as these tendencies -schematically indicated here -actually doestablishthemselvesindevelopedmodernsocieties,thestructural
forceofsystem imperativesinterveningintheformsofsocialintegrationcan no longer hide behind the rationality differential betw-een sacred and profane domains. The modern form of understanding is too transparent to provide a niche for this structural violence by means of inconspicuous restrictions on communication. Under these conditions it is to be expected that the com¬petition between forms of system and social integration would become more
.~
visible than previously. 1n the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration even in those areas where a consensus-dependent co¬ordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproductionofthelifeworld isatstake.In theseareas,the mediaiization of the lifeworld assumes the form of a colonization.
Notes
N. Eisenstadt, "Cultural Traditions and Political Dynamics: The Origins and Modes of Ideologica IPolitics." British Journal of Sociology 32, 1981, p. 155ff.
2 M.Blochalsouses acommunications-theoretical approachtoexplaintheideologi¬calfunctionsthatactionspassed downfrom the periodoftribalsocietycan takeon in class societies. The formalism according to which ritual practices can assume such functionsmaybecharacterizedin termsofrestrictions on communication. M. Bloch, "The Disconnection of Power and Rank as a Process." In S. Friedman and
M.J. Rowland (eds), The Evolution of Social Systems (Lon don,1977); and idem,"T he Past and Present in the Present." Man , 13, 1978, p. 278ff. 3 Sec, for exa mple, L.Mair, A ll Introduction toSocialAnthropology (rev.edn), (Oxford, 1(72), p. 229. 4 On the contrast between ritual and sacramental practice, sec Mary Douglas,
Natural SYl11ho!s (London, 1973), p. 28I. 5 L. Mair, An Introduction to Socia! Anthropology, p. 229. 6 Strictlyspeaking.noteventhephilosophicaldiscourseofGreekphilosophywas
specialized about the isolated validity claim of p ropositional truth.

5/4260 How to Write a Response Paper

How to write a response paper

These should be 1 page single-spaced.

You should discuss your reaction to one or more of the readings in a way that reveals your knowledge and understanding of the readings. Are the authors right? Insightful? Are their ideas useful, for others or for yourself? Have they changed your thinking regarding the direction of your own research?

The first response paper is
due at the start of class this Wednesday July 9.

Graduate students will need to write papers every week. Undergrads will need to write 3 papers over the course of the semester.

This week you should discuss one or more of the following readings:

William Sewell jr., The Concept(s) of Culture (handout)
Philip Smith, Introduction: What is Culture? What is Cultural Theory? (Smith I)
Lynn Spillman, Introduction: Culture and Cultural Sociology (Spillman)

Richard Harvey Brown, Textuality and the Postmodern Turn in Sociological Theory (Smith II)

Philip Smith, 37-57 (Smith I)

Raymond Williams, Base and Superstructure (Spillman)

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” (Spillman)

Habermas, Jurgen, “On Systematically Distorted Communication”



5/4-260 Graduate Students' Presentations

Schedule for Graduate Students' Presentations


Week 2 Mon. July 14, Adam Harold

Wed July 16 Shilpa K.

Week 3 Monday July 21 Fatih Tombul

Wednesday July 23 Maia Cudhea

Week 4 Monday July 28 Christy Cooksey

Wednesday July 30 Megan Carroll

Week 5 Monday August 4 Kenya Keme

Wednesday August 6 Giovanni dortch

Friday, July 4, 2008

SOC 5/4-260 Cultural Theory Summer II

Dear Students,
Our class begins Monday. If you read this and are taking the class as 5260, begin to consider which day you would like to lead class discussion. The assignments are on the class syllabus:

http://gignatow.googlepages.com/culturaltheory

Here is the rough organization of the course:

week 1: intro and Marxist/Critical cultural theory
week 2: Marxist/neo-Marxist theory and Weberian theory of religion
week 3: neo-Weberian cultural theory and cultural anthropology
week 4: Symbolic Boundaries, Bourdieu, and the Sociology of Culture
week 5: Durkheimian and neo-Durkheimian cultural sociology, sociology of culture and cognition

Thursday, July 3, 2008

SOC 4000 Summer I grades are now on my.unt.edu

If you can't access your grades, just wait for the UNT system to process them. I guess it won't take too long.

GI

Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Intro Theory Lecture Notes for Final Exam Summer I 2008

IV. Major American Theorists

The origins of American sociology

American sociology originates during Reconstruction, following the Civil War. As in Europe, the mid- to late-19th century was a period of intense urbanization, but in the American case, also of immigration, mostly from Europe.


Very rapid flow of ideas from Europe (although translations from German and French were not always available or accurate)


Americans were trained in European universities

1858- course in “Social Problems” at Oberlin College

1873- William Graham Sumner (Herbert Spencer’s American protégé) begins teaching “social science” at Yale

1880s- “sociology” courses begin to appear

1889- first American sociology department, at the University of Kansas

1892- Sociology department founded at the University of Chicage—becomes dominant American department for 30-40 years

Early American sociologists were not nostalgic (compare with Ferdinand Toennies)

They were political liberals, generally unfamiliar with Marx’s writing

They were social progressives; they believed in progress, w/or w/out government action

There was a strong influence of Protestantism: desire to save the world, in this case using science rather than scripture: to “solve social problems” without radically changing society

Compared with Europe, sociology was easily established in American universities, which were newer and rapidly expanding

American sociology was mostly positivist, “scientistic” and pragmatic

Turned away from Weberian interpretive historical approaches, Verstehen

Less theoretical interpretation of long-term changes

More quantitative analysis of short-term changes

Until WWI, Social Darwinism was highly influential

Herbert Spencer (UK) à William Graham Sumner (Yale)

The Chicago School

The University of Chicago was dominant in American sociology from roughly 1900-1935-ish

Encouraged a scientific approach to sociology

Robert Park (former journalist, trained in Germany with Simmel)

Initiates tradition of “urban ethnography”

Charles Horton Cooley

George Herbert Mead

Study social psychology, “Symbolic Interactionism” (micro-sociology of identity, subjective experience)

We’ll discuss these more later.

Structural Functionalism

The Chicago School collapses in the 1930s, center of influence in American sociology shifts to Harvard, specifically to Talcott Parsons

Critical of “dust bowl empiricism” of the Chicago School and Midwestern sociology generally—lack of theoretical ambition or imagination, focus on small problems

1937, Parsons publishes “The Structure of Social Action”

(more on him later)

Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore were Parsons’s most famous students (functionalist theory of stratification)


Structural functionalism is dominant in American universities from the 1930s-early 1960s, then falls apart

Rejection of Structural-Functionalism


“Europeanization” of American sociology, renewed interest in Marx, Weber and Durkheim, minus Parsons’s idiosyncratic interpretation of them


1)
return of conflict theories

a. neo-Marxisms, e.g. Critical Theory; Feminist theory


2)
emergence of cultural theory

a. Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Michele Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu

b. Social Constructionism (Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann)

c. Post-positivism, Postmodernism, rejection of “scientism”


W.E.B. DuBois (all of ch. 7)


Taught sociology at Atlanta University, although is remembered more as a public intellectual than as an influential theorist

Like Bourdieu and others, DuBois did not distinguish theory from practice

Not a professional academic theorist; someone who wanted to explain and improve the situation of African-Americans (not long after abolition, 50 years before the Civil Rights movement, affirmative action)

DuBois’s mother was a maid, father a barber, preacher, drifter—left the family.

His mother died while he was a boy.

By age 16 he was self-conscious of his race, the “color line,” and class

Four white men paid for his education at Fisk University, in Nashville, Tenn.—an all-black university

Thought that African-Americans should organize together, accept the color line—they should not organize and strive in terms of values of individualism, egalitarianism, or economic participation (e.g. Booker T. Washington and the Tuskegee Institute, a technical institute in Atlanta)

DuBois teaches poor black children in the east Tennessee countryside, goes on to Harvard University.

7th ever African-American student at Harvard; first to complete a PhD there

While studying at Harvard, DuBois traveled to Germany. Was astounded to find himself studying among non-racist whites—including Max Weber, who likes DuBois’s work.

DuBois returns to the U.S., is politically active:

—against racism, colonialism, imperialism

—for communism, socialism


Major ideas

the “race idea”—which he took seriously, accepted without much questioning

the “color line”—relation of the “darker” and “lighter races” across the world (the American Civil War is just one example, not unique)

“double-consciousness” or “two-ness”—the experience of being of African origin and American—a divided identity (prefigures identity politics, sociological interest in identity construction)


“the veil”—metaphor, in which African-Americans and their problems are hidden from white America, and African-Americans have a unique perspective on “White America”


“colortocracy” of light-skinned blacks in the African-American community—excessive pride in their noses, skin color, hair


The “talented tenth” of African-Americans would lead their communities

Writes The Philadelphia Negro (1899), which was commissioned by the University of Pennsylvania as a study of the problems of Philadelphia’s black community. DuBois is ambivalent about this kind of study. It is insulting, patronizing, and probably won’t lead to any real change—on the other hand, he does it, and it makes known the social situation of African-Americans, which would otherwise be hidden.

The Souls of Black Folk (1903) was his major book on race and class. He was the first to write about these issues sociologically and systematically


Political career

Debates with Jamaican Marcus Garvey, who wanted to bring African-Americans back to Africa.

Loses all popularity

Seen as snobbish (which he was), elitist

Proponent of socialism, communism—neither are popular in America


Regains popularity since the 1970s-ish

Post-colonial studies, studies of globalization

Ethnic and racial studies, departments, multiculturalism

e.g. at UNT we have Women’s Studies and Jewish Studies departments, an African-American Studies institute, Mexican-American Studies, and the Study of Sexualities

Establishment of departments of African-American studies, e.g. Harvard has the W.E.B. Dubois Institute for African and African American Research—a famous institute, often in the news, a site of major academic controversies

Henry Louis Gates Jr., Cornel West (left for Princeton)—academic, philosopher, and rapper, he appeared in The Matrix and The Matrix Reloaded


George Herbert Mead (all of ch. 8)

1863-1931


Born in Massachusetts, trained at Harvard and with the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt in Germany.


Was interested in Darwinism and economic theory, as well as psychology and sociology

Upon graduating from Oberlin in 1883, Mead took a grade school teaching job, which, however, lasted only four months. Mead was let go because of the way in which he handled discipline problems: he would simply dismiss uninterested and disruptive students from his class and send them home.


Most famous book: Mind, Self and Society, which was published after his death

Sociologist, pragmatist (non-metaphysical) philosopher, and psychologist

Pioneering figure in American sociological social psychology, or micro-sociology

As a psychologist he was opposed to Watson’s positivism and behaviorism—which were based on the idea that the person could only be studied using scientific methods developed for the physical sciences (e.g. B.F. Skinner).


Positivism ignored the self-concept, and the social sources of the self. Thus Mead was a social psychologist.


Humans are unique in that they can take the perspective of other actors towards objects. This is the other. As a child matures, by taking others’ perspectives routinely in daily life, they internalize the generalized other, the amalgamation of all the other people with whom they have meaningful interaction. This is how social influence works, and it enables complex human society and social coordination.

A contrast to this view is behaviorism and rational-choice economics. In both, people respond to their environments by directly calculating what is in their self-interest, and pursuing their chosen goals through the optimal means (see Weber on the forms of rationality). UNT today has a department of behavioral psychology.

For Mead, existence in community comes before individual consciousness. First one must participate in the different social positions within society and only subsequently can one use that experience to take the perspective of others and thus become self-conscious.


Mead writes in Mind, Self and Society that human beings begin their understanding of the social world through “play” and “game.”


"Play" comes first in the child's development. The child takes different roles he/she observes in "adult" society, and plays them out to gain an understanding of the different social roles.


When more mature, the child can participate in the game, for instance the game of baseball. In the game he has to relate to others and understand the rules of the game. Through participating in the "game", he gains the understanding that he has to relate to norms of behaviour in order to be accepted as a player. This is the child's first encounter with “the generalized other.”

There are two phases (or poles) of the self: (1) that phase which reflects the attitude of the generalized other and (2) that phase which responds to the attitude of the generalized other. Here, Mead distinguishes between the "me" and the "I." The "me" is the social self, and the "I" is a response to the "me" (Mind, Self and Society 178).

“The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes”

Mead defines the "me" as "a conventional, habitual individual," and the "I" as the "novel reply" of the individual to the generalized other (Mind, Self and Society 197).

The "me" is the internalization of roles which derive from such symbolic processes as linguistic interaction, playing, and gaming; whereas the "I" is a "creative response" to the symbolized structures of the "me" (i.e., to the generalized other).

Political Utopianism

For Mead, the human social ideal . . . is the attainment of a universal human society in which all human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence, such that all social meanings would each be similarly reflected in their respective individual consciousnesses — such that the meanings of any one individual's acts or gestures (as realized by him and expressed in the structure of his self, through his ability to take the social attitudes of other individuals toward himself and toward their common social ends or purposes) would be the same for any other individual whatever who responded to them(Mind, Self and Society 310).

Supporter of the League of Nations

Talcott Parsons

1937, “The Structure of Social Action”

Discusses Weber, Durkheim, Pareto

In so doing, introduces theory as a legitimate area within American sociology

His translation of Weber, and his interpretation of all 3, are now seen as biased

He suggested that all three were building to his Structural Functionalism


He was concerned with “macro” sociology, with the relations among large-scale social structures and institutions

His emphasis was on order, dynamic equilibrium (as in functionalist approaches generally)

  1. Social System
  2. Cultural System
  3. Personality System

Social change is orderly, evolutionary


C. Wright Mills – Radical Sociology in America

Born in Waco, TX in 1916, conventional middle-class background

PhD at the University of Wisconsin, spends most of his career at Columbia University

Dies of his fourth heart attack at age 45, 3 marriages with one child from each, many affairs

Outsider in many ways, had trouble with his professional relationships as well

He was at odds with American society

Challenged Talcott Parsons (Structural Functionalist), but also Paul Lazarsfeld (rememberd for his contributions to sociological methodology)

Ideas

Marx was either reviled or ignored in American sociology, although there were exceptions, and C. Wright Mills was one of the most notable

Not a sophisticated Marxist, not very familiar with Marx’s ideas

He was a rare American “radical sociologist” though, meaning he was a

Class theorist, a power theorist

“White Collar” – analyzed the new occupational category of white-collar workers

“The Power Elite” – showed how America was dominated by a small group of white male businessmen, politicians, and military leaders—in spite of American conceits of pluralism and democracy, of a balance of competing interests

This is a “political economy” that Mills refers to as the “triangle of power”

Power in the United States had once been decentralized, spread among the states with a weak federal center

Since WWII, business and government have become increasingly unified—think of Eisenhower’s warning about the “military-industrial complex”

The men of the power elite come from similar social and educational backgrounds, similar careers and styles of life

These men move easily between the three points of the triangle

Mills argued that competing interests and competition only occurred among members of the middle class, and middle-sized enterprises (e.g. labor unions and political parties—these change, but the structure of power and privilege does not).

At the “commanding heights” of the economy, military, and government, there is unity and class self-interest.

Social revolts against this system—the agrarian revolt of the 1890s, the small-business revolt since the 1880s, the labor revolt of the 1930s—have all failed to change anything (also the Reagan revolution in the 1980s, the Republican Revolution in the 1990s, Clinton’s “reinventing government” in the 1990s)

Mills argues that intellectuals need to openly discuss and debate the structures of power in American society.

Separation of the civil service from corporate interests.

Free associations of communities, families, smaller groups should be able to influence the national political economy.

“The Sociological Imagination” (1959) (damning critique of Parsons)


Robert Merton

Robert King Merton (July 4, 1910February 23, 2003, born Meyer R. Schkolnick to immigrant parents)

He spent most of his career teaching at Columbia University

"self-fulfilling prophecy."

"role model"

Revised Parsonian functionalism, retaining an interest in the integrative functions of social institutions, and, with Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, a focus on the integrative role of normative values in social life.

Merton parts ways with Parsons in his analysis of the dysfunctions of social systems, for example in his discussion of:

For Merton, manifest functions and dysfunctions are conscious and deliberate, the latent ones the unconscious and unintended.

The manifest function of a rain dance, is to produce rainhttp://www.angelfire.com/or/sociologyshop/manlat.html

The rain dance’s latent function is to produce social integration.

Berger, 1963: "...the “manifest” function of antigambling legislation may be to suppress gambling, its “latent” function to create an illegal empire for the gambling syndicates.

Or the control of the Communist Party over all sectors of social life in Russia “manifestly” was to assure the continued dominance of the revolutionary ethos, “latently” created a new class of comfortable bureaucrats uncannily bourgeois in its aspirations.

Or the “manifest” function of many voluntary associations in America is sociability and public service, the “latent” function to attach status indices to those permitted to belong to such associations.” "

The manifest function of bureaucracy (Weber’s rational-legal authority) is to produce efficient outcomes. But bureaucracy has "unintended consequences,” dysfunctions and latent functions. Merton discusses the “bureaucratic personality” as an example.

Bureaucrats who work in the same role for long periods of time become mentally inflexible, they cling to routines that may no longer be functional, and they treat customers badly because they come to feel that they know all that can be known within their small area. At home they treat their families as they treat their customers and coworkers at the office (e.g. schoolteachers treating adults as children)

Merton also developed theories of deviance and a sophisticated sociology of science. He emphasized normative values and culture, and manifest and latent functions, in this work.

Merton advocated “middle-range theory” – smaller theoretical ideas that would allow broader theoretical frameworks (Marxist, Weberian, Durkheimian, Parsonian, etc.) to be challenged and tested

Combined broad [European-ish] theory and historical knowledge with an attention to empirical detail and verification

In this way he was a forerunner of contemporary sociology. Modern sociologists almost never create theories ex nihilo. So, in some ways “theory” ceases to exist as a separate sphere within sociology after the 1960s. Since Parsons, there has been almost no one who can be considered a major theorist per se.


5) Social Constructionism

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, “The Social Construction of Reality”

In the 1960s, SC provided a radical new alternative to Functionalism and Conflict Sociology

Part of the turn to cultural theory. SCism has been influential well beyond sociology, particularly in studies of science.

B&L develop a sociology of knowledge, a way of thinking about how we know things, about common sense knowledge (“recipe” knowledge), not intellectual knowledge per se.

How do we know that the earth revolves around the sun? That today is Thursday? How do we know how to behave in different situations? How do we know ourselves?

Their approach is that of phenomenology, or thinking about the experience of existing, of consciousness, empirically although not scientifically, through reflection, introspection, and description.

They are perspectivists: knowledge is always knowledge from a certain social position.

For B&L, human nature is “world-openness”: people are born into the world unformed, unlike other animals.

Humans have no “species-specific environment.”

Human instincts (“drives”) are unspecialized and underspecified: we have to be taught almost everything we need to survive.

Humans have immense plasticity: we can be formed into all different types, unlike other animals. E.g. sexuality is treated very differently in different cultures. What is attractive to one person or a member of one culture is repulsive to another.

We need “culture” to survive, and culture is a product of society and history.

Society and culture are not imposed on people, as Marx or Parsons might have it.. They result from human actions through several processes:

Habitualization – psychological gain of reducing alternatives to action, by making action habitual; human nature to need this

Institutionalization as habitualization occurs among groups, action become institutionalized – it becomes official, dogmatic, and historically long-lasting – e.g. the incest taboo, institutions of marriage, living arrangements, hierarchies, identities (student, teacher, father, mother, worker)

Culture is a result of processes of historical sedimentation, of ideas and habits and recipe knowledge layered on top of one another over historical time and within individual minds.

Language is a depository of historical sedimentations. Language gives ontological status to semi-arbitrary historical reifications: e.g. social categories like Black, Jew, Asian-American, English, French.

Ideas of social functions are intellectual abstractions attached to institutions ex post facto. E.g. gender, inequality, organizations.

Language and culture create a protective “universe” of cultural meanings that shield the individual from the terror of being alone and mortal.

Mythology, theology, philosophy, and science provideconceptual machinery” that allows for universe-maintenance.

Internalization of the cultural universe

Through primary socialization of the child as a member of a society. Mostly through identification with the parents, and through language.

Internalization of the “generalized other” (Mead)

Secondary socialization into a specific segment of society (worker, student, mother). Role-specific vocabularies.


6) Feminist Theory

Feminism has a long and rich history in the United States, from the Victorian era in the late 19th century, in cities, to the feminist movement of the 1960s and 70s, to debates over affirmative action and women’s rights today.

A. Gender Inequality

In the 19th century, women were legally analogous to children

Today, worldwide, women are ½ the population but own a small fraction of the world’s land and property, make a fraction of the income of men, they are limited in terms of their educational and career opportunities, denied legal rights (such as voting rights), and suffer from spouse abuse and other forms of abuse

B. Women and Sociological Theory


As sociology developed, women naturally became interested in trying to explain gender inequality (just as Marx wanted to explain class inequality, and DuBois the “color line”)

Women, however, were generally denied opportunities for higher education, and certainly for careers in academia


C. Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935)


From a prominent New England family, difficult childhood—father left, moved around

Deeply depressed after her marriage and the birth of her daughter. Divorced husband, gave her blessing to his remarry her close friend and raise her daughter.

Gilman’s depression lifted when she was able to work, unencumbered by family responsibilities.

Gave lectures around the U.S.

Secured her reputation in feminist circles when she published Women and Economics (1898)

Advocated women’s economic independence from men

Public day care

Cooperative kitchens

Wanted peaceful socialism

Argued that the nuclear family was dysfunctional for women. It was more natural for “women’s work” (cooking, cleaning, childrearing) to be done communally, as was the case in most human societies, rather than alone and isolated in the home.

The traditional family structure is inherently exploitative—women work, but are not paid.

Gender inequality is a product of socialization in the family, not inherent biological differences.

Girls and boys learn their gender (not sex) by dressing differently, being praised and scolded for different things.

And yet, she thought that men and women were innately different. Because of evolution, women are antiselfish, they want to love, to nurture. Men are competitive, want to fight, take control.


There were racist sections of her writings, and she seemed to be speaking mainly for white women. She was against slavery and the oppression of African-Americans, and genocide and oppression of Native Americans, though.


D. Contemporary Feminist Theory


Gilman’s feminist theory is almost common sense to many sociologists today, aside from the racist parts.

Feminist theory today has taken a “postmodern” turn:


Feminism against sociology: some feminist theorists are highly critical of sociology because of its male-centeredness, blindness to women


Feminism against science: view of science as a masculine, dominating enterprise


Feminism against globalization and neo-liberalism (more expressly political): the structure of the world economic system is inherently exploitative of women: e.g. sex slaves, wage inequality, poor health care and day care for immigrant working women

Review Sheet for Final Exam, SOC 4000 Summer I 2008

Soc 4000 Intro to Sociological Theory Review Sheet for Final Exam

Introduction to Sociological Theory

Review Sheet for Final Exam: Sociological Theory in America

(Thursday July 3, 10-11:50)


The final exam covers the overview of sociology in America, Social Darwinism, the Chicago School, Structural Functionalism, the rejection of Structural Functionalism, W.E.B. DuBois, C.W. Mills, Charlotte Perkins Gillman and Feminist Theory, George Herbert Mead, and Robert Merton.

You should be able to define and discuss all of the following terms:

Reconstruction

Urbanization

Immigration

Oberlin College

Yale University

University of Kansas

University of Chicago

Progressive Movement

Social Darwinism

Herbert Spencer

William Graham Sumner

The Chicago School

Urban Ethnography

Symbolic Interactionism

Robert Park

Charles Horton Cooley

George Herbert Mead

Structural Functionalism

Talcott Parsons

“The Structure of Social Action”

Neo-Marxism

Critical Theory

Social Constructionism

Feminist Theory

Post-positivism and post-modernism

W.E.B. DuBois

Fisk University

“color line”

Booker T. Washington

Tuskegee Institute

“double-consciousness”

“the veil”

“the talented tenth”

“colortocracy”

The Philadelphia Negro (1899)

The University of Pennsylvania

The Souls of Black Folk (1903)

Marcus Garvey

Gender Inequality

Charlotte Perkins Gillman

“Women and Economics” (1998)

Nuclear family

Gender socialization

Sex differences

George Herbert Mead

Mind, Self, and Society

the "other"

the "generalized other"

the "I"

the "me"

pragmatist philosophy

rational choice economics

behaviorist psychology

the self-concept

"play" and "game"

C. Wright Mills

Radical sociology

“The Power Elite”

Triangle of Power

“military-industrial complex”

Social revolts against the power elite

“The Sociological Imagination” (1959)

Robert Merton

self-fulfilling prophecy

role model

bureaucratic personality

manifest and latent functions

dysfunctions

unintended consequences

middle-range theory

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